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COPYRIGHT AS A MODEL FOR FREE
SPEECH LAW: WHAT COPYRIGHT HAS IN
COMMON WITH ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY

LAWS, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, AND
TIDECO~CATIONSREGULATION

REBECCA TuSHNET*

Abstract: Copyright raises real and troubling free speech issues, and
standard responses to those concerns are inadequate. TIlls Article aims
to put copyright ill the context of other free speech doctIine.
Acknowledging the link between copyright and free speech can help
determine the proper contours of a copyright regime that both allows
and limits property rights in expression, skewing the content of speedl
toward change.
INTRODUCTION

vVhat is "protected expression"? Suppose you write an article
criticizing a public official. If the government cannot prosecllte you
for the article or award damages in a libel case brought by the official,
your speech is protected. On the other hand, if the government can
give you an i~unction or award damages against someone who copies
the article, your speech is protected. So your speech can be protected
against the government, or by the government. These two common
meanings of protected expression are each found in different areas of
the law. Speech protected against the government is First Amendment
speech, and speech protected by the government is intellectual property. The First Amendment declares that speech is free, while copyright means that people may be made to pay for speech. So, which is
it?

* Associate, Debevoise & Plimpton. lowe Mark Tushnct a great dcbt for his commcnts
and his self-restraint, and Jack Balkin for his assistance at cvcry stagc. L.'\\TCncC Lessig.
Richard Primus, Kim Roosevclt, Zachary Schrag. and Tim Wu pro\idcd man}' hclpful
comments. As I have doubts about the concept of independent allthorship. responsibilitr
for any remaining errors is no more mine than responsibility for any insights. C'.omlllcnts
are welcome at rebecca@tushnet.com.
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The conventional answer is both. l The First Amendment gets
government off speakers' backs, while the Copyright Act enables
speakers to make money from speaking and thus encourages them to
enter the private marketplace of ideas. But this apparently simple relationship hides some profound tensions. When one speaker wishes to
use another's words, or even words that, taken as a whole, are "substantially similar" to someone else's words, the government may tell
her that she cannot. If she has printed books with those words in
them, her books may be seized and destroyed by U.S. marshals, 01' she
may be enjoined from trying to sell them. When such situations arise,
why does free speech apparently give way?2
This Article aims to put copyright in a context of other free
speech doctrine. Part I considers how copyright raises real and troubling free speech issues and why the standard responses to those concerns are inadequate.s The conventional responses do not defend
copyright law because it promotes speech, but rather analyle copyright
as if it furthers a generalized legitimate government goal, one like
physical safety. From that perspective, the government is required to
pursue its legitimate interest without using means that impermissibly
trench upon free speech. The main aspects of copyright that prevent
it from impermissibly restricting free speech, in this view, are the
ideal expression dichotomy and the principle of fair use. This Part
argues that neither principle adequately addresses the free speech
concerns generally thought relevant in other areas of free speech law.
Part I also sets forth potentially less restrictive alt(!rnatives to copyright
as we know it and rejects the argument that the First Amendment is
simply a property regime like copyright. Thus, Part I provides a criI

See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Cmiae Association of American Publishers, Inc., Harpel' &

Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (No. 83-1632) ("[I]f the First
Amendment is the moral force of publishing, copyright is its commercial fouudation ••••
[C]opyright and the First Amendment are essentially complementary."); Hal'vcy S.
Perlman & Laurens H. Rhinelandel; Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United Stales: Pholocopying.
Copylight, and theJudicial Process, 1975 SuP, CT. REv. 355,404 ("While the First Amcudmcnt
facilitates the flow of information by preventing government intervention, the copyl'ight
system encourages the development of information and its disseminlltion by providing
incentives for publication. The conflict, if lIny, is in method not purpose,"); Michael D.
Blitten, Note, Constitutional Fair Use, 20 Will. & MARY L. REv. 85,92 (1978) ("[C]opydght
seeks by actively encouraging what the first amendment seeks by strictly discourOlging.").
2 Brief of Gannett Co. et at., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. NlItion Enters., 471 V.S.
539 (1985) (No. 83-1632) ("Read literally, the First Amendment would invalidate Ihe
Copyright Act"); see also Paul Goldstein, Copyright ami the First A11Iem111l1'll/, 70 COLOM. L.
REv. 983, 989 (1970); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amend11lent Perspective 011 Ihe /t/ea/E;-:pressioll Di·
chotolllY a1ld Copylight in a n'clrks "Total Concept a1ldFee/, "38 EMORY LJ. 393, 393-9'. (1989).
3 See i1lfra notes 8-126 and accompanying text.
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tique of copyright from the perspective of stmidard First Amendment
theory, but its aim is not to demonstrate that copyright is or might be
unconstitutional. Rather, my goal is to make possible a redlinking of
stmtdard First Amendment theory in light of copyright's constitutionality.
Part II sets fordl dIe free speech justification for copyright."
Copydght is "the engine of free expression,"5 prO\iding people \\idl
property incentives to speak and disseminate speech. The argument
that copyright encourages speech may allow copyright to sweep further dIan purely speech-suppressing regulations. But copyright is not
unique. Part II shows dlat dIe free speech issues raised by copyright
are related to controversial claims about fi..ee speech laws in odlcr
contexts, such as hate speech, pornography, and campaign finance,
which makes the lack of controversy over copyright law even more of
a puzzle. These other arguments, concerning how plimte parties'
speech may suppress others' speech, have not been integrated into
prevailing free speech doctrine in dIe same way as dIe analytically
similar argument about copyright. Properly understood, cop}'light
can become the engine of free expression in a second sense: Not only
does it enable free speech, but copYlight can drive free speech dleory
in unexpected but important directions.
IT we believe standard First Amendment dleory, dlen we should
believe that copyright is unconstitutional because it is designed to
suppress some speech to generate other speech, a result dIe Supreme
Court condemned in the campaign finance context. But dmt would
be silly; copyright is constitutional, in large part because it does encourage speech by dIe people it protects. The problem is widl dIe
stmtdard theory: Government is already invoh'ed in shaping available
speech, and dlat's a good dling. Ow' objections to particular government regulations-and there are valid ones-must be to dleir bias or
ineffectiveness, not to the mere fact of government action.
4 See infra notes 127-214 and accompan}ing text. This Article \\1l1l1ot take up the debate o\,er how well copyright writ large scr\'es to generate more speech. That dcb:lle has
been e.'>:tensh·eiy addressed elsewhere. &e, e.g., Stephen Breyer, 77,e crllmsy Case lor CAPJriglzt: A Stud), oj CoPJ'right ill BoollS, Photocopies, alld CAmputer Programs, 84 lIAR\'. L. RE,·. 281
(1970); Robert M. Hurt & Robert N.. Schuchman, The &onomic Rationale 0/ CAPJriglll, 56
kl. EcoN. RE\,. PAPERS & PROC. 421 (1966); William M. Lmulcs & Richard A. Posner, .tll1
EC01W11Iic AlIaf)'sis ojCAPJ'n'"gllt Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). Instead, I will assullle that.
in general, people \\111 do more of what they can get paid for. That this ilia}, not be tme at
the margin or in certain special cases \\111 affect the boundat1cs of an ideal coppight regime, not the overall justification for the e.'>:istence of copp1ght.
5 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
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The Supreme Court recognized the government's fundamental
involvement with creating the conditions for speech in the recent
Turner Broadcasting cases, which upheld a law requiring cable opel'ntors to carry local broadcast signals on some of their channels. 6 The
Turner cases offer a new way to evaluate government speech restrictions that are designed to promote certain kinds of speech. By requiring substantial evidence in support of a legislative conclusion that
regulation will better promote speech than inaction, the Court is attempting to balance issues of institutional competence with fem's that
speech will be suppressed. The Turner analysis is different from most
First Amendment tests because it explicitly concerns itself with the
possibility that some speech will disappear if the state regulates, while
other speech will disappear in the absence of regulation.
Consistent with Turnel; free speech doctrine should acknowledge
that the principles supporting copyright are applicable to other areas
of the law. Otherwise, copyright will remain a fn!e speech anomaly, an
area of the law with a fully articulated speech-based justification that
nonetheless contradicts the rest of accepted doctrine. We should not
rest content with a copyright founded on special pleading.
Part III briefly applies the theory elaborated in the earlier parts
to a few aspects of copyright. 7 Essentially, we should recognize that
copyright's limits are as important as the rights it grants to property
owners in keeping "tlle engine of free expression" running properly.
Acknowledging tlle link between copyright and free speech can help
us determine the proper contours of a copyright regime that both
allows and limits property rights in expression, skewing the content of
speech toward change.
1.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT AGAINST COPYRIGHT

. Copyright gives the government authodty to seize books and enjoin their sale, award damages against booksellers, or even send them
to jail. Following preliminary ex parte proceedings requiring only a
modest showing, federal marshals may seize works accused of infdngement and the machines used to reproduce those works. s The
6 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hercinaftel' TIII'llt'/' Jl1;
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter 7ilrllt'/' IJ.
7 See infra notes 215-249 and accompanying text,
8See 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1994) ("At any time while an action under this title is pending.
the court may order the impounding, on snch terms as it may deem reasonable, of nil top..
ies or phonorecords claimed to have been made or used in violation of the copyright
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proceedings may be sealed so that the defendants will not get word of
what is being alleged before the marshals burst in.9 If a jury finds that
the accused works are infringing by a preponderance of the evidence,
they may be destroyed.!o These steps in the process of suppressing
copyright infringement are considered so routine and uninteresting
that opinions justifying them are rarely even published.ll If the
justification were anything other than copyright, these sweeping powers would be seen as a gaping hole at the heart of free speech lights.
In standard First Amendment scholarship, claims that speech belongs to no one and that willing listeners have a right to hem" ml)'thillg
they would like to hear are common.12 The Supreme Court has held
that potential audiences are generally not required to incur cxtt<t
costs to get speech that someone '">'ants to supply them.!' This holding
mmer's exclusive rights, and of all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negativcs, or
other articles by means of whicll such copies or phonorecords ma}, be reproduced.1.
9See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. Y. jasso, 927 F. Supp. 1075 (N.D. III. 1996);
Century Home EntIn't. Inc. v. Laser Beat, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 636 (E.D.N.V. 199·.).
lOSee 17 U.S.C. § 503 (b) (1994).
llSee, e.g.;U2 Home EntIn't. Inc. Y. Sang Kim, No. 98-CV-4159, 1998 U.s. Dist. LE.XIS
17683 (E.D. Pa. No\,. 4,1998); Basquiat \'. Baghoomian, No. 9O-CIV-3853 (LjF), 1992 U.s.
Dist. LEXIS 7622 (S.D.N.V. May 22, 1992) (conceming books made by collecting a successful artist's images); D.C. Comics, Inc. Y. john Doc" Nos. 1-25, No. 89-1669, 1989 U.s. Dist.
LEXIS 7398 (D.D.C.june 26, 1989) (granting blanket permission to search for and seize
allegedly infringing materials from street vendors in the DisUict of Columbia); WorMs of
Wonder, Inc. y. Vector Intercontinent.l.l, Inc., No. C86-2671, 1986 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 15879
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 30, 1986); if. Richard Harrington, DlmL.il/g a New CmlL'<i: Comirs for lite
Rock-alld-Roll Genl!Talion, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1991, at Gl (discussing comic books about
the rock groups Bon jo\'i and MotIey Crue tIlat were destroyed as part of a settlement in an
infiingement suit).
12 See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, Equalil)' al/d Fm! Speech: The Cos~ ,\gail/sl Subslal/lh~ Equal.
il)~ 82 IOWA L. REv. 645, 673 (1997) (quoting CLAUDE LEFORT, DEMOCRACY AND POUTICAL
THEORY 33 (Da\id Macey trans., 1988».
13 The Court stated that:
'\Te are aware of no general principle tImt freedom of speech may be abridged
when the speaker's listeners could come by his message by some other means,
such as seeking him out and asking him what it is. Nor have we recognized
any such limitation on the independent right of tIlC listener to rcceh'e the in·
formation sought to be communicated.

Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy y. Vrrginia Citizens Consumcr Council, 425 U.s. 748, 757
n.15 (1976); see also Globe Newspaper Co. Y. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 50·. (1982)
(right to information on public e\'ents such as trials); Linmark Assoc. \'. Tm\1lship of Will·
ingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977) (right to receh'e commercial speech); \bung y. American
:Mini Theatre, 427 U.S. 50, 77 (1976) ("rhe central First Amendmcnt concern remains the
need to maintain free access to tIle public to tIlC c.xpressiOll.1; Kleindienst \~ Mandel. 408
U.S. 753, 760 (1972) (discussing tIle right to "receh'c information and ideas1; Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("[T]hc people as a wholc retain ••• thcir
collecth'e right to have tIle medium function consistentIy \\itIl the ends ami purposes of
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should make copying a First Amendment activity, as a copier may offer an alternative source of information that the audience wants and
can obtain more easily than by negotiating with the copyright ownet~1<1
Yet courts easily reject First Amendmen t claims in copyright
cases.I5 Free speech belongs to no one, but copyrighted speech belongs to someone. Robert Denicola and Melville Nimmer have undertaken extensive defenses of copyright against First Amendment challenges; their work laid the foundations for any subsequent inquil'y.t6
They both recognize minor First Amendment limits on copyright in
highly important news material, but in general they find that copyright itself provides the necessary limits to address any concerns about
public access or free speech rights. Two internal limits have been
critical to their thinking, and to all who followed: the ideal expression
dichotomy and fair useP
the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount."); Griswold v. COllnecticut, 381 U.S. 479, ·182 (1965)
(free speech includes the light to speak, the right to distribute, and the right to rcccive
speech).
14 SeeL. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, a/l(l Fair Use, 40 V,\ND. L. REV. 1,3 (1987);
Harry N. Rosenfield, The Constitlltional Dimensions of Fair Use in Copyright Lalt', 50 No'l'IU':
DAME L. REV. 790, 796-98 (1975); Lionel S. Sobel, Copyright ami the First ,hllt'llIll/wllt: J1
GatheringStorm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43,66 (1971).
15 See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Ch~ 1978)
("[D]efendant's [First Amendment] claim can be dismisscd without a lcngthy discusSiOlI."); Sclmapper v. Foley, 471 F. Supp.426, 428 (D.D.C. 197D), aff'd, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp.415, 422 (S.D.N.V.
1971). Most commentators react similarly. See, e.g., NIl Copylight Ptolectioll Act of J995:Joinl
Heming on H.R. 2441 and S. 1284 Before the Sllbcolllm. 0/1 COllrls allli Intellectl/al PJ'operly of IIII!
HOllse Jlldiciary COIllIll. and the Senate jlldiciary COIllIll., 104th Congo (1995) (tcstimony of
Bruce Lehman, Commissioner of Patents) ("The First Amendment has always provided a
completely different standard with regard to liability for actions that constitute spccdl as
compared to actions that constitute copylight infringement. They're rcally just applcs lind
oranges .... [I] t docs a disservice to both areas of law .•. to analogize frolll onc to the
other."). Although Professor Nimmer's important treatise on freedom of speech addrcsscs
copyright, see MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 2-55 to 2-8,1 (student cd. 1984) [hereinafter NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH], the best-sclling constitutionlll
law casebook in the country devotes over 400 of its 1600-odd pages to frecdom of cxprcssion, with only one sentence and three citations about copyriHht. See GEon'REv R. STONE
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL L\w 1289 (2d ed. 1991).
16 See Robert Denicola, Copylight ami Free Speech: Collstitlltiollal Limitatiolls 011 the P/'oll'("
tioll oj Expressioll, 67 CAL. L. REv. 283, 289-99 (1979); MclviIl(' B. Nimmcr. DOL'S Copydght
Ablidge the First A1I/el/dmellt Guarantees ofFree Speech and Press 7, 17 UCLA L. lU:v. 1180, 1190
(1970) [hereinafter Nimmer, Copyright].
17 While both Denicola and Nimmer were aware of copyriHht's specch-gencmtillg fcatures, they only used those features to prop up the defense of ide<l/ expression IIIld f<lh' usc
as central speech-protecth'e limits. Others examining the problem have similady fOCUSl·d
011 idea/expression and fair use. See, e.g., Los Angeles News Sel'v. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791.
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This Part addresses the claim that copyright's internal
configuration is sufficient to avoid a First Amendment challenge.
"While Part II takes up the First Amendment-based argument for copyright, here I argue that non-speech arguments are insufficient 011
their own to defend copyright against free speech cIiticisms. In Section I..A., I show that the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use
defense do not eliminate free speech problems; if anything, they
make copyright seem even less supportable, a confusing body of law
likely to deter speakers from speech that might potentially be thought
to infringe. Section LB. suggests some less restrictive alternatives to
copyright as we know it. The existence of such alternatives makes
copyright seem like an excessive, and thus unconstitutional, response
to the problem it was designed to solve. Finally, Section I.C. explains
that recent property-based visions of the First Amendment cannot
solve the problem by folding free speech law into a Valiant of an intellectual property regime.
A Standard Responses to First Ame1ldment Claims Against Cop:)'1iglzt

1. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
The idea/expression dichotomy, now embodied in § l02(b) of
the Copyright Act, holds that only expression cml be copyIighted, and
not the idea, process, or other more general principle that underlies
the particular expression.18 Because anyone who wishes cml use the
ideas found in any copyrighted work, there is, it is said, no free speech
795-96 (9th Crr. 1992); Floyd Abrams, FirstJlmclldlllent alld Copyright: 17,eSn.orlltrrt,t" DOllald
c.. Brace Mcmoriol Lecture, 35].. COPYRIGHT Soc. I, 3-l (1987); Celia Goltl\\'ag. Copyrighl
Infringement and tJ,cFirst Ame1ldmcllt, 29 COPYRIGHT L. SniP. (ASCAP) 1,4 (1983); \\'emlr
J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of CofJ)'rigllt: The ChallCllgrs of Col/sistNlCj, Col/SNlI, ami
Encouragemellt TIzcory~ 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343, 1383 n.189 (1989) [hercinaflel· Gordon, ...111
Inquiry! into tJzc Merits]; Da\id E. Shipley, Collflitts Bl!tnwlI CofJ)"ight al/(I the First ...lll/ClIdmCllI
After Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 1986 BYU L. RE\', 983, 998, 10·t2,
OtIlerways in which tIle copyright law accommodates free speech concern arc occasionally
mentioned, but tIley generally take a back scat to these two plimary limits. ~, e.g., Brief of
Gannett Co., Inc., snpra note 2 (tIle exclusion of cop}nght fOI· facts, the exclusion for
works of tIle U.S. government, and tIle originality requirement); Stephen Fraser, 17,e
Conflid Between the First Ame1ldmellt alld Copyright Law alld lIs Impad Oil Ihe II/ttrl/d, 16 CAR·
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 13 (1998) (facts); Goldstein, supra note 2, at 1020-22 (original.
ity); Goldwag, snpra, at 4-5 (limited duration of cop}nght and originality); Nimmer, Copyright, supra note 16, at 1193-96 (limited term).
18 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("In 110 case does cop}nght protection for an original
work of autIlOrship e.xtend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of tIle form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in sucll work. ").
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problem, as the copyright has not taken from the public domain
thing of First Amendment value. 19

any~

a. The First Amendment Value ofExpression
We tend to think of copiers, unlike other speakers, as pirates 01'
lazy people whose speech does not further frc::e speech values. OUI'
image of a copier is not of an actor who recites a playwright's lines 01'
a local 'politico reciting the party platform, though these people copy
too. But, we assume that those people have the right to copy 01' need
no permission to do so, and so we don't examine their merit. We only
look at the value of unauthorized copies. While visceral reaction to
pirates is natural, it does not sufficiently distinguish a copier-particularly one who is not copying wholesale and for profit-from other disreputable, but protected, speakers. In general, the First Amendment
protects even speech which is not original to the speaker;20 and the
Supreme Court has stated that it protects individuals' right "not only
to advocate their cause but also to select what they believe to be the
most effective means to advocate their cause."21 "[A]s we know from
the example of publishing houses, movie theaters, bookstores and
Reader's Digest, communication occurs in selecting which speech to
copy and distribute no less than in creating the speech in the first
place. "22
Speakers are allowed to choose their preferred modes of expres~
sion because altering expression could well change tlle meaning and
the impact of tlle message. Famously, the Supreme Court protected
19 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., ·i'll U.S. 539, 560 (1985); sec
also Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751: Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDomlhl's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Ch~ 1977) ('1'he 'marketplace of ideas' is not Iimitcd by
copyright because copyright is limited to protection of expression."); Wainwright Scc. Illc.
v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977): Fantasy. Inc. v. Fogert)'. 6tH F.
Supp. 1345, 1351 (N.D. Cal. 1987): Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environlllental Actioll
Found., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 630,634 (D.D.C. 1977); NIMMER, FREEDOM 01.' SI'EECH. slIpm
note 15, § 2.05[C], at 2-66 ("It is exposure to ideas, and not to their particuhll' expressioll.
that is vital if self-governing people are to make informed decisions."); Denicola. slIpm
1Iote 16, at 290-91: Nimmer, Copyright, supra note 16, at 1189-ml; Pamela Sallluelson. &lli!,.
iug Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses i1l Righi of Publicity ami Copyright C(/ses, 57
TUI.. L. REv. 836, 881-83 (1983).
20 See Nimmer, CojJylight, supra note 16, at 1181.
21 Meyerv. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988).
22 Turner l, 512 U.S. 622, 675 (1994) (O·Connor. j., concurring and dissenting in
part): see also Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. United Sch. Dist. No. 118,9 F.3d 1295. 1302 (7th
Cir. 1993) ("A city may not limit booksellers to vending the works they write thelllselvcs; II
state may not exclude newspapers printed outside its borders, .•• That mlopting the expression of others is a form of speech we freely concede. ").
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Paul Cohen's right to wear a jacket proclaiming "Fuck the Draft" in
public.23 The Court held that the expression can often constitute the
idea: "[VV]e cannot indulge in the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words 'without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. "24
These words may seem inapplicable to copyright, where generally
the words are not suppressed but limited to a particular class of people who pay to use them.25 But, if the owner will only authorize their
use in contexts that are favorable to the author, then the state is enabling the owner to ensure that his expression will only have one
meaning and will not be available to use in oppositional ways.2G This is
23 See Cohen Y. Califomia, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971); Str also Guglil'lmi ,~ SpellingGoldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458 (Cal. 19i9); Stanlcy Ingber, 771t! Mmkrlpla(~ oJ Itlrns: It
Legitimizing i\f)'tJI, 1984 DUKE LJ. 1. 34-36 (arguing that. because pcrsuasion is not fullr
rational, content and form are not separable in practicc). Limits on use of another's expression may even be fundamentally offcnsh'c to a speakcr's sense of self. Whcn J.D. Salinger's biographer was sued for infringemcnt for quoting Salinger's lettcrs, he was asked why
he did not paraphrase the contents "ith ncutral words that did not use Salinger's expression. He replied that he would be ashamcd to put his namc to sllch a\\'I"'':Ird and gutted
prose. See Salinger Y. Random House. Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1987).
24 See Colzell, 403 U.S. at 26.
25 The ideale.xpression dichotomy might bc a kind of "manner" restriction, like rcgulations that prohibit broadcasting any noisc abovc a ccrtain IC\'cl. ~, r.g., Mctromcdia,
Inc. Y. San Diego. 453 U.S. 490 (1981). In thc right of publicity contc."t, the Tenth Circuit
recently dealt witll a similar claim:

[1]n tile context of intcllcctual property, [tllC] "no adequatc alternath'c a\'cnues" test does not sufficiently accommodatc tllC public's intcrest in free expression. Intellectual property. unlikc real estatc, includes the words, imnges
and sounds tllat we use to communicatc•..• Restrictions on tllC words or images tllat may be used by a speakcr, tllcrcforc, arc quitc diffcrent tlmn restrictions on tile time, place, or manner of spccch.
Cardtoons, L.C. Y. Major League Bascball Playcrs Ass'n .• 95 F.3d 959, 971 (lOth Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted). The idea/expression distinction fnils tllC standnnl timc, pl:tce and
manner test, which requires tllat a regulation bc justified \\ithout rcfercnce to the content
of tile regulated speecll" and tltat "ample altcrnativc channcls for commllllirntioll of the
information" remain. Clark v. Cmty. for Creativc Non-Violcnce, 468 U.s. 288, 293 (1984).
Protecting expression from copicrs dcpcnds 011 tllC content of the speech, since noncopied or fairly used e.xpressioll and facts arc all fair gnlllCj morco\'cr, wherC\'cr a copier
can speak, she ,~illnot be allowed to usc tllC particulnr words at issuc. Bill if. Robert Post,
Recuperating First Amelldmcllt Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. RE\,. 1249, 1260-70 (1995) [herein:uter
Post, RecuperatillgFirst AlIlelldmellt Doclrillc] (criticizing timc, plncc and n1:ln11Cr doctrine for
its incoherence and its propensity for autllorizing C\'cr-incrcasing government restlictions
on speech).
26 Copyright claims are ob,iously motivatcd by disagrccment \\ith a defendant's Illl'5sage in some cases. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Cu: Y. SCOlt, 82 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1996) (one of
a large number of cases brought by Scientology agninst critics); Unitcd Christian Scientist'S
v. Christian Science Bd. of Dirs" 829 F.2d 1152, 1156 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing at-
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troubling because an inability to use the most evocative expression
possible diminishes the power of a speaker's message. 27 The Supreme
Court has recognized that, if the government allows private patties
exclusive control over cable systems and then allows them to screen
out objectionable speech, the First Amendment may be violated. 28
The same argument can be made with respect to exclusive state·
backed control over expression. Moreover, a payment requirement
may put certain speech beyond the reach of a large group of speakers
and listeners, which is in itself u·oubling.
There are two related points here: First, the ideal expression diM
chotomy recognizes no value in preserving a "breathing space" for
free speech. In other areas, the Supreme Court has announced that
we must tolerate a certain amount of valueless, destructive speech,
because we want to avoid self-censorship by speakers who fear that
juries or judges might find them liable. 29 If courts do not err 011 the
side of finding unprotectable ideas instead of protectable expression,
dley run the risk of suppressing important speech.
Second, the relationship of ideas to expression explains why ex·
pression deserves strong First Amendment protection. Even if we are
confident in theory that a thesaurus and some thought will produce
an alternate way to say almost anydling with almost as much grace,
courts never actually make this inquiry and it would be hard to hung.
ine them doing so. To decide whether it is possible to express a pat'·
ticular idea in a d~ferent way, we have to determine what is idea-ish
about the idea and what is its expressive raiment. That is, we would
have to decide what Leaves of Grass says and how to say it in another
way while still communicating its exact idea. There will be nearly as
many different answers to this question as there are readers, and that
is what makes Leaves of Grass so very protectable. Similarly, "It's mom·
tempts by one group of Christian Scientists to use copyright to block the distl'ibutioJ1 of
another group's unorthodox version of Mary Baker Eddy's writings); Ma.'(tonc-Gmhl1ln v.
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986) (pro<hoice author :med anti--choice allthol' fOl'
copyright infringement based on a quotation). In Grll1111berg u Upjolm Co., 137 ER.D. 372
(D. Utah 1991), a manufacturer tried to use copyright to protect 90,000 pieces oflitigatioll
documents from dissemination by the media in order to prevent pllblic access to the potentially embarrassing contents of those documents.
27See Int'l Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 789 F.2d 1319, 1321
(1986) (Kozinski,]., dissenting).
28 See Denver Area Ed. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 768 (1996).
29 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (citation omitted) (finding
that the First Amendment required an actual malice standard rOl' intentional infliction of
emotional distress by a parody in a magazine in order "to give adequate 'breathing spare'
to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.").
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ing in America" is important for its expressive power in making a political point. The law protects expression (in fi'ee speech and copyright) because, in fact, expression is what makes speech worthwhile.
Thus, it is incorrect to say that there is no First Amendment value in
"expression," as opposed to ideas.
Yet copyright is reconciled to fi'ee speech with the claim tllat expression does not mean all that much to our shared artistic, intellectual, and political lives. The ideal expression dichotomy is troubling
because it denigrates tlle value of expression while still attempting to
justify tlte legal protection of expression as property. '''le protect expression from copying not because expression is uuimporlcUlt to tlle
free flow of ideas, as tlle ideal expression dichotomy suggests, but because it is so important tllat it must be encouraged by state-backed legal protections.so
30 NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 15, § 3.01, at 3-6 to -9. The difficulty of
denying expression's value has been recognized by defenders of the idea/expression distinction who have felt compelled to make exccptions for special cases. Mehille Nimmer
identifies limited cases in which "the 'idea' of a work contributes almost nothing to the
democratic dialogue, and it is only its c-xpression which is meaningful." Nimmer, O1pyriglll,
supra note 16, at 1197. He suggests that this is ob\iously true of much graphic art, though
copyright should still protect artworks because society genera11)' has little need of free
COP)ing of such works. See id. In the case of vcry important pictorial representation of
newsworthy events, though, an exccption should bc made: coppight should not allow an
author to control photographs of an C\'ent likc thc My L'li massacre. &r it!. at 1197-98.
Unfortunately, what is important enough to qualil}' for this c.xception \\i11 be highly uncertain, like the rest of the infringcment test.
There is also a subtle contradiction bctwcen thc ovcra11 theory of free speech put
fortll by scholars such as Nimmer and tllC proposal to make exceptions for expression in
really significant cases. For Nimmer, news pictures arc morc important to a democrntic
dialogue than ....erbal reports, no matter how eloqucnt, becausc people perceive picturc..'S
differently than words. If tllis is a correct undcrstanding of how humans process information, howC\'er, tllen Nimmer's underlying commiuncnt to rational self-government as the
fundamental purpose of tile First Amcndment becomes more troublesomc. Ifwe arc creatures who cannot reduce some of our decpest reactions to words, if our politics has to
transcend words ;Uld look to symbols at crisis points, thcn wc are 110t really talking ahout
rational, coolly deliberativc self-govcrnmcnt. A picturc is not an argument. If that picture
is nonetheless \ital to democratic self-governancc, then maybc direct, poinl-h}'-point political argument is not tile central valuc of specch. And if that is the case, then Nimmer's
central distinction between politically important and decorativc speech begins to break
down:

Some of tile most influential forces in our culturc do not make an argument
or appeal to the intellect: music, \isual art, and a grcat deal of atl\'ertising (including political ad\'ertising) conuibute to thc "markctpl:tce of ideas"
through sound, imagery, and nonrational appeals to passion and desire. It
would be difficult to say that a Madonna concert makes a suietl), rational "argument," yet Madonna's "communications" ha\'c had at least as greal an effect on our culture and political lifc as most books of anal)1ic philosophy or
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b. Low-Value Speakers
The argument that piracy is not valuable speech depends on the
idea that a particular speakeris low-value, regardless of the actual content of the copied speech. The same speech by different (authorized)
speakers would deserve the full range of constitutional protection.
Speaker-based discrimination is not unknown to First Amendment
law. The Supreme Court has, for example, approved a preference for
broadcasters over cable operators in certain circumstances.:l1 But
speaker preferences usually require the government to demonstrate
that it is not discriminating on the basis of content or viewpoint and
that it has a good reason for its actions. 32 At the least, speaker-based
discrimination should put a heavier burden of justification on copyright.
Even assuming that the use of someone else's words provides a
speaker only minor convenience, avoiding copying still burdens her
speech somewhat. Generally, the state cannot impose liability on a
speaker simply to protect another private party's interests. In Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, the Supl'ell1e Court
struck down a requirement that an electric company allow a con..
sumer group to insert material in its billing envelopes. 33 While the
electric company had no "right to be free from vigorous debate •• , it
[did] have the right to be free from government restrictions that
abridge its own rights in order to 'enhance the relative voice' of its
opponents."34 Justice Marshall, concurring, wrote that: "[w]hile the
interference with appellant's speech is, concededly, very slight, the
State's justification-the subsidization of another speakeI' chosen by
the State-is insufficient to sustain even that minor burden. "35 One
might distinguish Pacific Gas & Electric Co. because the Court faced a
political science.... [O]ne cannot restrict First Amendment protection to
the rational or ~cognitive" without ignoring what works as pel'suasion in pill>lic discourse and vastly expanding the government's power to censor.
David Cole, Playing by Pornography's Rilles: The Reglliation of Se:~/lal &pressioll. 1<13 U. 1),\, L.
REv. Ill, 125-26 (1994). Nimmer is of course entirely aware of the difficulty of dctc1'lllllling what speech is important to self-governance, and he holds that overtly non·political
speech serves valuable First Amendment goals. See NIMMER, FREEDOM m' SI'EECII, SliPi'll
note 15, § 3.01, at 3-6 to 3-9.
31 See Turner II, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
32 I discuss good reasons for copyright below; the point here is that courts dOIl't
botller to make such an inquiry in copyright cases.
33 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986).
3-1 [d. at 14 (plurality opinion).
35 [d. at 24 (citations and fooUlote omitted) (Marshall,]., concurring).
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situation in which a speaker was forced to subsidize an enemy of that
speaker's viewpoint. A copiel~ arguably, is not an enemy of a speaker's
viewpoint. Thus, copyright does not restrict speech in order to enhance the relative voice of anothel~ but restlicts speech to let a viewpoint-identical but rights-holding speaker prevail.
This is not what really happens in many significant copyright
cases, however. J.D. Salinger's biographel~ for example, hardly shared
Salinger's viewpoint, and yet was found to have infringed because he
quoted Salinger's letters. Similarly, extensive quot."ltions from L. Ron
Hubbard's published and unpublished writings justified a finding of
infringement in the Second Circuit, though those quotes were \lsed
precisely to show what a fi-aud Mr. Hubbard was. Here we seem to
have speakers whose words (including their illustrative quot."ltions
from their targets) are being suppressed to enhance the relative
voices of their opponents.
Copiers also add expression, as the Nation did when it excerpted
parts of Gerald Ford's biogmphy as part of a story on what the biography revealed about White House politiCS.36 The underground cartoonists of Air Pirntes created twisted caricatures of innocent Disney
chamcters that required time, thought, and creativity,S7 as did a commentary on the OJ. Simpson murder tlial done in the style of Dr.
Seuss.38 All were found to infringe. Particularly when it comes to nonliteral copying, courts may be incapable of deciding what constitutes
"opposition" to a copyright owner's viewpoint. ,,,7hat was Andy Wm'hol
saying with those Campbell's soup cans, mlyway? How many sides does
an issue of artistic judgment have?
We could say that the expression t."lken by a copier is not valuable
as speech, even if the rest of what she says is. (Of course, it is valuable
as property, which is a bit embarrassing to the theory of value.) Thus,
the law states that no pirnte can defend against a claim of inflingement by showing how much she created herself.s9 Yet other areas of
free speech law resist such a conclusion. The test for obscenil)~ for
example, requires that a work as a 11lhole must lack literary, artistic, poSee Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. Y. Natioll Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
See Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 758.
38 See Dr. Seuss Enters. Y. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394. (9th Cir. 1997).
39 See, e.g., Rogers Y. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,308 (2d Cir. 1992) (W[N]o copier may defend
the act of plagiarism by pointing out how much of the copy he has not piratt.·d.-); Sheldon
Y. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (1.. Hand.].) ('TnJ(~. much
of the picture owes nothing to the play; .•• bUl thal is entirely immatclial; it is enough thal
substantial parts were lifted; no plagiarist can excuse the \\TOng by sho\\ing how much of
his work he did not pirate.").
36

3i
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litical or scientific value in order that it may constitutionally be suppressed. Accused purveyors of obscenity can defend themselves by
showing how much they created that was not obscene. In defamation
and libel law, inaccurate statements of fact-(!ven those made with
knowledge or reckless disregard for their falsity-are constitutionally
protected if the overall work is "substantially correct" or lacks malice.40 In other words, defendants accused of defhmation can prevail by
showing how much of their work was true or in good faith.
The usual justification for looking at an accused work as a whole
is that courts fear a chilling effect. If a fragment of a work could be
punished for violating some prohibition, publishers would have a
much more difficult time determining what was allowable; they would
have to scrutinize each paragraph for possible offense if taken in isolation. Publishers would also be unable to rely on the overall message
of the work, even though works are normally consumed in their entirety rather dIan as disconnected passages. 41 The reported cases ill
which using small amounts of another's copyrighted expression in a
larger work led to liability are disturbing, because they allow suppression of an entire work for a small taint.42
We could conceive of the low-value speech argument in dlis way:
Free speech law recognizes a certain set of facts about the world as
40 See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516-17 (HI91) (holding
that the law of libel overlooks minor inaccuracies and requires analysis of the challenged
article as a whole); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286 (196,1) (holding that
the fact that a published account ,vas "substantially correct" provided a complete deft'lISe
to a defamation claim even if parts were wrong): Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F,lId
310,319 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that most of the allegations offered to support a particular conclusion were true so that one false allegation was not actionable evell if mall·
ciously made).
41 See Saint Surin v. Virgin Islands Daily News, Inc., 21 F.3d 1309, 1317 (3d Ch~ 1994)
(,'"Words take on meaning in the company of other words. Th<,y are gregadous. They take
on tone and color from syntax and context. In defamation actions, words should be consU'ued as they would be understood by the average reade1~ ").
42 See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that
a preliminary injunction might be appropriate against a tc\("'ision show that displayed
portions ofa copyrighted poster in the background for 26 seconds total); Woods v. Univct"
sal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp.62 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding the film 1'wl'/vt: A/ol/lwys
infringing because it used a copyrighted image of a chair); Aicleen F'liardo, /Jo(y GlIse of
Copyright Infril/gemellt, Batman!, 4 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 263 (1997) (discussing a silnilill' rase
over use of artwork in the film Batmall): Francis X. Clines, Grea,toT ofReligiolls Art PI't'tllliis ill
Vevit' Film, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1998, at A6 (discussing lawsuit ngainst the film Dt'tli/'s AliI/a.
cate for containing an image of a sculpture reminiscent of a sculpture Oll the Natiollal Cathedral). But see Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp.409 (S.D.N.V. 1997)
(finding fair use in a momentary use of copyrighted photogmphs as backgrollnd in the
film Seven).
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relevant when deciding whether or not certain speech is regulable;
those facts are not contained in speech but determine the level of
protection such speech gets. For example, whether a person is a public or a private figure will determine whether negligent misst.'ltements
of fact about that person will subject a speaker to liability.43 Whether
an exhortation to kill is made in a play or by one mobster to another
·wi.1l determine whether the speaker is guilty of criminal conspiracy. It
could be that whether a speaker has paid the requisite fee to a copyright owner is that kind of fact. 44 Facts are relevant when they prove or
disprove the existence in a particular case of the harms against which
a speech regulation is directed.45 The fact that a person has paid a fee
to a copyright owner proves that there is no risk that her speech ·will
negatively affect the incentives of future speakers to create copyrightable expression, or the fact that her appropriation was
sufficiently transformative proves tllat punishing her would not serve
tlle goal of encouraging new speech. But tllis justification is not based
on any inherent feature of expression as opposed to ideas; it is a facet
of the speech-based justification for copyright, which I take up in Part
II.
c. Self-Fulfillment and Stability
First Amendment theorists have suggested tllat copyright infringement does not serve any value tlIat free speech is generally
thought to further. Lack of originality supposedly means that copying
does not serve a self-fulfillment function, in which the speaker ex-

See Gertz v. Robert ""TeIch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Once we scrutinize cop)Tight with an eye to its relationship to frec speech, Robert
Post's claim that there is no one "free speech principle" that justifies the entire sct of rights
generally called "freedom of speech" seems much more pel'suash·e. ~ ROBERT C. POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNrn·, MANAGEMENT 16 (1995); Post,
Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, supra note 25, at 1271-73. Com'entional c:lmlidatcs
for such an o\'erarching principle such as "distrust of government regulation," s« Geoffrey
R Stone, Autollomy alldDistrost, 64 U. COLO. L. RE,'. 1171. 1178 (1993), and "indhidual
self-realization," see Martin H. Redish, The tr,lll~ ofFm! Spmh, 130 U. PA. L. RE\,. 591, 593
(1982), do not seem to fit all that well into an area of law that holtls that all speech should
be free, as long as it is not owned by someone else.
45 CJ. 44 Liquormart, Inc. y. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (plurality opiuion)
(",.../hen a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from misleading.
deceptive, or aggressive sales practices .•. the purpose of its regulation is consistent with
the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore
justifies less than strict review.").
43

44
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presses that which is most herself. 46 Likewise, no one is going to dot
over a copyright dispute, and so there is no "safety valve" function illvolved. 47
The self-fulfillment and stability arguments are not very persuasive. The self-fulfillment point fails to look closely at the practices that
many people actually do find fulfilling: expressing their commitment
to certain cultural, political, or social groups in conventional and even
stylized ways.48 Indeed, the more that a member of a group adheres to
that group's script, the "better" a member she often is. Just as a personal choice protected by the First Amendment can consist of giving
allegiance to an extant faith-choosing to be a Catholic or a Democrat rather than developing one's own religion or political partyautonomy interests are also served when a person chooses to copy
what someone else has said, endorsing it as her own:!!) Speech is 110t
guaranteed only to the well-educated, with thesauruses at theil'
fingertips, or the creative.5o

46 See United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974) (''We do not
find any denial of freedom of expression to the 'tape pirate'. What hc seeks is not the
freedom to express himself artistically or otherwise, but the right to make exact and identical copies of sound recordings produced by others."): NIMMER, FREEDOM o~' SI'EECII,
supra note 15, § 2.05[C], at 2-67; Goldwag, supra note 17, at 7 ("Onc who appropriates the
expression of another is not engaging in self-fulfillment: rathe!; he is ;\pprop1'iating linother's labor without exerting any effort."); Sobel, stlpra note ]4, at 72; Leonard W, Wllng,
Note, The First Amendment Exception to Copyright: ,1 Proposed TEst, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 1158,
1181.
47 See NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 15, § 2.05[C], at 2-66 to 2-67; Sobl'l,
supra note 14, at 73.
48 See JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POUTICS OF TIlE PERFORl\IATl\'E 27, 39
(1997) (discussing the ways in which using conventionalized exprcssions can actuall), Increase the power of speech by evoking well-known associations). Professor NiIlUIICI~ who
makes the argument that copying serves no self-fulfillment interest, writes in that "[TJhcl'c
may be no audience at all, and yet the self-fulfillment function will somctimcs be scn'ed b)'
engaging in some forms of speech. An example of this is the satisfaction that may be expt"
rienced by singing a song aloud although there is 110 one to hear." NIIIIMEIt, FItEEDOM 010'
SPEECH, supra note 15, § 1.03 at 1-50. Though he might be imagining that tltc lone singel'
has composed her own song, he probably isn't, and she probably hasn't. Site enjoys hCI'
performance nonetheless, just as many people gain fulfillmcnt by retelling stories tltC}'
have heard before, see JAN HAROLD BRUNVAND, TIlE "'\NISJIING HITCIJIIIKER: AMEIUCAN
URBAN LEGENDS AND THEIR MEANINGS (1981), or even by making II» stories abollt »opular (copyrighted) television and movie characters, see I-IENRY JENKINS, '!\':XTUAL l'OACIIEltS:
TELEVISION FANS AND PARTICIPATORY CULTURE (1992); Rebccca Tushnet, Legal Fir/iolls:
Copydght, Fan Fictioll, al/d aNew Common Law, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT. LoRcv. 651 (1997),
49 See, e.g., Stanton by Stanton v. Brunswick Sch. Dcp't, !J77 F. Su»». 1560 (D. tile.
1984) (graphic quote from Time describing capital punishmcnt could 110t be bat'l'cd Ji'omlt
yearbook simply because it was powerful).
50 As noted by the Colorado Supreme Court:
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The extension of protection to every speakel; however derivative,
can be justified by reference to general democratic theory, which ,'Cllues the contribution of each citizen to the political process.51 The
more people vote the better, even though they may well be choosing
between only two options. The truth is that most equal, autonomous,
choosing individuals do not have much revelatory to say; they contribute by participating, not by breaking new ideological ground. A
person who recites John Stuart Mill chapter and verse is doing at least
as much to further political discourse as someone who composes an
original ode to liberalism. The Mill disciple will not contlibute much
to democratic dialogue if she is not in a position to offer cogent responses to questions from the people to whom she speaks. Even her
ability to marshal quotations, however, is a contribution, since persuasiveness is not the test for protected speech.52 Moreovel; a speaker's
belief that Mill's words are appropliate to a particular political situation is itself a valuable interpretation of :Mill, just as a politician who
quotes the Bible in debate is taking a particular religious and political
stance.53

The ideas e..'I{pressed by defendant's conduct may seem to some to bejm'cnile
and inarticulate, and perhaps his actions are subject to inteq>rctations other
than we have given, but this does not strip his "specch" of constitutional protection. The First Amendment is not the e..'I{dusi\'c property of the cducatcd
and politically sophisticated scgmcnt of our population; it is not limited to
ideas capable of precise explication.

S"

Colorado Y. Vaughan, 514 P.2d 1318, 1322 (Colo. 1973);
also Hurlcy \'. Irish·American
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) ("[A] narrow. succinctly articlllable message is not a condition of constitutional protection."); Tinker \'. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (black armband signifying opposition to Vietnam War was protected speech despite lack of specific messagc); Ingber. slIpra note 23, at
33-34 (discussing how bans on disrupti\'e speech are biased against thc poor, the ill·
educated, and social outcasts).
51 See Ingber, slIpra note 23, at 11.
52See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. GOv't PAC, 528 U.S. 377. 120 S. Ct. 897. 919 n.3 (2000)
(Thomas,J., dissenting) ("We regularly hold that speech is protected when the undcrJ}ing
basis for a position is not given.").
53 I am not claiming tllat democracy is tlle only real justification for free speech. My
point is tllat eyen a Meiklejohnian democracy-promoting theory. which oftcn scenlS to
limit tlle scope of the First Amendment, does notjustil)' cxcluding copying from the realm
of protected speech acti\ities. Meiklejohn did not think that it was important for C\'cl'}'one
to speak, only tllat e\'erything wortll hearing be 5.'lid. In that sense. his self-go\'cmmcnt
tlleol'}' is consistent \\itll copyright. But speech worth hearing and copyright O\\1lcrs'
speech ,\i11 only oyerlap if copyright succeeds in tllC work I describe in ParllI: gcnerating
new speedl. Self-goyemment is tllcrcfore unable to justify copyright \\ithollt reference to
copyright's speech-promoting function. In addition. the controls 011 dissemination that
copyright allows may prevent people from receiving wortllwhile specch.
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As for the safety valve argument, it is probably true that there has
never yet been a riot over the suppression of copyright infringement.
But it is equally true that there has yet to be a riot over the suppression of books from school libraries or any number of speech restrictions that nonetheless were deemed impermissible; because of its
speculative nature, the safety valve argument is generally a
makeweight. And if we widen the criteria for 'what counts as a safety
valve to include speech acts that prevent alienatjon from goVel'lllllent
and disrespect for the law,54 copyright appears to be clogging a fair
number of safety valves. Outrage at the apparent scope of copyright
law and a declared intent to violate that law ar(: reasonably prevalent
on the Internet,55 where people are more likely to publicize their dissatisfaction than when they are denied the ability to copy at IGnko's.M
That such outlaws most likely will never be sued probably does not
make them respect tlle broad scope of tlle law, and the randoll1ness of
enforcement may worsen the problem. This is certainly not a reaSOll
to reject copyright, but it does suggest tllat safety valve concerns are
not absent in tlle area. 57
54 Such widening could be defended on the grounds thaI the traditional articulatioll
of the safety valve justification assumes a particular kind of 5pcakcl~ namely a relatively
powerful (white male) speaker who feels that he has the option ofviolcnce if he call1lot say
what he wants to say. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassmel/t ami Ihe IlIjo/'llUl!
Ghelloizalion of n'omen, 106 HARV. L. REv. 517, 560-61 (1993); K.1thlcen M. Sullivan, 11w
Supreme Collrl, 1991 Term-Foreword: The jllslice ofRilles ami Siandarels, 106 HAR\'. L. Ih:v. 22.
42 (1992). Other kinds of speakers might react in different, but also damaging, '\~lyS, s\lch
as sabotage.
55 See, e.g., The Free Mllsic Philosophy (V 1.1), at http://wwlV,ram.org/ramblings/philosophy/fmp.html (last visited Mar. 31, 1998); Ncgativland, Fair Use, at http://www,lIegativ.
land.com/fairuse.html (last visited Mar. 31, 1998); Negativland. Stllff, at http://www.ncg.
ativland.com/nmol/negmisc.html (last visited Mar. 31, 1998) (advcrtising T-shitt with the
logo "Copyright Infringement Is Your Best Entertainmcnt Valuc"); The Viral CO/lllllllllim·
lions Anti-Copyright Policy, at http://www.cyborganic.com/pcople/vir-comm/projccts/allti.
copy/ (last visited Mar. 31, 1998).
56 See Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure aTllI Prisoller's Dilemma ill Illleilec/IIlIl
Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 853, 855 n.13 (1992) ("[L1egal prohibitions against copying
pose noneconomic dangers that private modes of fencing-off do not, such as crcating ill
the user population a perception of governmental compulsion, which could givc risc to a
species of resentment"); if. Gordon, An Inqlliry inlo the Merils, slIpra notc 17. at 1345-46
(1989) (describing average consumers' feeling thatjusticc allows thcm to copy tapcs thcy
own or tape music off the ail').
57AllOther related argument concerns the "checking value" of frce spccch, Vinccnt
Blasi suggests that "the abuse of official power is an especially scrious CVil-1l101'C scdom
than the abuse of private powel~ even by institutions such as largc corp01"iltions which call
affect the lives of millions of people." Vincent Blasi, The Checkillg l'allll! illl-i,.sl AI//('//(/I//('II/
Theol)~ 1977 &1. B. FOUND. REs.]. 521, 538. Maybe we should not be so COllCCl'1lCt\ about
private parties' control over the content of expression for that feason. This argu1l1ent docs
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d. Vagueness and Subjectivity

Another basic problem with using the idealexpression dichotomy to resolve free speech concerns is that the distinction between an
idea and the concrete form it takes is entirely too vague.58 Indeed, the
most famous and well-received explanation of the dichotomy appeals
to its vagueness. Judge Learned Hand wrote:
Upon any work ... a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the
most general statement of what the work is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but tllere is a point in tllis
series of abstractions where tlley are no longer protected,
since otherwise the playwlight could prevent tlle use of his
"ideas,» to which, apart from tlIeir expression, his propert}' is
never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fl., tllat
boundary, and nobody ever can.59
It is unsurprising, then, tlIat judges often disagree amongst tllemselves about when it is necessary to use a particular fragment of expression or whetlIer the idea could have been expressed in some
other, nOllcopying way.60 Particularly since infringement can be found
not answer the question of what le\'el of 5Cnlliny to gh-c to cop}Tight: Public \;olcnce may
be worse at its worst than private \;olence, but primtc abuse is worth considering. S« Goldstein, supra note 2, at 997 (discussing thc privatc monopoly power of largc corporations
\\;th control o,'er many copyrights); Eugcne Yolokh 8: Brctt McDonnell, Frrttfoll/ oJSpt«1i
and IndepemlentJudgment Review in Copyright CasI!S, 107 YALE L.]. 2431 (1998) (suggesting
that private enforcement may be more dangerous to spcech becausc it may be morc permsive and effective).
58 See Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression DieJlotomy ill Cop)'ligllt Lall~ 56 TENN. L. RE\·.
321, 398 (1989) ("The idea-c....pression dichotomy simply does not lend itself to ••• precise
and easy application_ ... Even in thc definition of what is idea and what is c.xprcssion, the
doctrine probably incorporates just as many perplexing issul'S as does the first amendmcnt
itself."); Yen, supra note 2, at 396-97; Dianc Leenheer Zimmerman, bljonrralioTl as Spt«1i,
Infonnation as Goods: Some Tlwugllis on Mar/u!lplaces alld 11z~ Bill oJ rogllls, 33 WM. 8: MAR\' L.
REv. 665, 709 (1992).
59 Nichols Y. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); s« auo Pcter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. Y. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 19(0) ("fhe test for infringement of copyright is of necessity vaguc.•.• Decisions must thcrefore inc\1tably be ad
hoc. ..• [Olne cannot say how fur an imitator must depart from an undC\;ating reproduction to escape infringement.").
60 See, e.g., Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. Y. Knight-Ridder NC\\'Spapcrs, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171,
1181 (5th Cir. 1980) (Bro\\n,]., concurring in part and disscnting in part) (disagreeing
with the claim that the "idea" of a n' GZlid~ cover mergcd \\;th its Yexpression" and claiming that the idea could have been rcpresentcd without rcproducing an actual n' Gllitit
cover).
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even without verbatim copying, in cases of "substantial similarity," it is
difficult to distinguish idea from expression. 61 Worsening the uncer..
tainty, the modern idea of a work'~ "total concept and feel" allows a
finding of infringement when the overall mood of two works is essen..
tially the same, despite the fact that there might be no single element
dlat is literally copied. 62 Neil Netanel suggests dmt the problem of
sorting idea from expression has become even less tractable now that
derivative works-works based on other copyrighted works such as a
film inspired by a novel-are explicitly protected.63
A vague law that restricts speech is usually thought to be uncon..
stitutional. Confused and uncertain, speakers will '''steer far wider of
the unlawful zone' than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were
clearly marked."64 A standard that freely admits that one case will
never provide much guidance for dle next case seems about as bad a
guide to safe conduct as one could imagine. Faced with a potentially
devastating lawsuit, speakers will be well-advised to steer as far as pos..
sible away from any arguable copyright infiingement, to spare them..
selves the risks of going before a judge or jury, and they should care..
fully limit the expression of dlOse for whom they may be vicariously
liable. 65 The potential chilling effect is tlms particularly great when
speakers, to reach an audience, need the help of publishers or Inter..
61 See Britten, supra note 1, at 78; Leslie A. Kurtz, Spealdllg'to the Ghost: Mea (l/ul E.\'/)/'('5'
sion in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1221, 1228, 1232-33 (1993).
62 See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's COil)" 562 F.2d
1157,1167 (9th Cir. 1977); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110
(9th Cir. 1970); Yen, supra note 2, at 410-11.
63 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright alld a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE LJ. 283,
304 (1996).
&1 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (citation omitted): see also Gmyucd \'. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (footnotes and internal quotes omitted) ("[\\'jl1t'l'(,
a vague statute abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedol1ls, it Opt'I"
ales to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.").
65 See Yen, supra note 2, at 425. Yen argues that copyright cases are more dangel'olls
than libel and defamation cases because juries can understand concepts of falsity, malin',
and recklessness more easily than they can tease out the difficult line between idea alld
expression. A copyright jury will be unpredictable, and thus pose a greatel' tlll'eat of chill·
ing speech. See id. at 426; see also Volokll & McDonneIl, supra not(' 57, at 2,J39 ("No 101lg·
standing social consensus tells us what is 'idea' and what is 'exprcssion'; no illtuitivdy o\).
vious line dhides the two categories."}. My argument is similar to that mlUie by some
recent critics of sexual harassment law. See Kingsley R. Brownc, U'OIkpll/ce Ce1l50/'ship: 11 Rt~
sponse toProjessorSangree, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 579, 581-82 (1995); Eugene Volokh, Frct'dow
oj Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791, 1811-12 (1992). I take no position here on Browne and Volokh's crilicisms of Title VII; I merely wish to suggest that
copyright, which sweeps far more broadly than harassment law and is unlimited ill potential subject matter, presents great incentives to limit speech.
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net service providers, whose institutional interests make one particular speaker's material not terribly important compared to a threat of
legal action for infringement or contributory infringement.GG
Subjective standards for distinguishing between unlawful appropriation and legitimate citation in copyright cases are also suspect OIl
free speech grounds. The influential Ninth Circuit infringement test
requires first an objective evaluation of the similarit.y of two works,
then a subjective evaluation.67 Yet the Supreme Court has sharply limited the availability of actions for intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on speech, holding that the distinction bet.ween outrageous and non-outrageous opinion "has an inherent subjecti\'eness
about it" that would allow defendants to be held liable just because of
a jury's "tastes" or preferences.58 This concern is consistent \\ith
vagueness law's fear of decisions made "on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discdminatory application. "69 A jury's SUbjective evalution of similarity may be very
difficult to predict.70
One could argue that infiingement cases are unlikely to be systematically biased against the opinions of out.-groups, whereas judg66 Sec, e.g., The X-Philes/Mi/lClliulIl Protest a/ http://databasc.simplenet.com/x/pro-tl'St.
html (last ,isited Oct. 30, 2000) (discussing an incident in which the Fox Network sent a
threat letter to university bec.l.Use of a student's web page, and the unh'ersity cut off the
student's internet access); cf. BrO\me, supra note 65; Volokh, supra note 65 (arguing that
an employer'S interests diverge from its employees' such that employers \\;11 suppress a
broad range of employee speech in order to avoid the risks of a lawsuit). The Digital Mil·
lenium Copyright Act limits online prO\;ders' liability for users' infringement if they take
down the accused material promptly. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1994). Though users can alkoge
tllat their material is not infringing, tile new law seems unlikely to change the basic dynamic.
6i SeeShawv. Lindheim, 919 E2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990). This test has C\'oh-ed from what
was earlier labeled an "extrinsic" and an "intrinsic" test of similarity. ~ Sid & Marly Kroffl
Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1157. But it has maintained the two-step proc(.'SS of analytic
dissection and tllen subjective, ordinary-observer comparison of tile protected and allegedly infringing works.
68 Hustler Magazinev. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
69 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1971).
70 Though tlIe government does not often cnforce tllC criminal copyright law, thus
perhaps reducing tile dangers of biased prosecution, the c.xistence of a prh":lte right of
action creates a large potential for arbitrary litigation, compounding the risks of the subjective test. The case law suggests tltat one may more readily criticize the Church of r..,UerDay Saints using Mormon documents ,,;tllOllt fear of litigation tI\:ln one mar criticize Scientology using the same metllods. See, e.g., Religiolls T«h Ctr., 82 F.3d at 423. Similarly, Disney engages in aggressive cop}right enforcement, while Paramolllll is r.,r more lenient for
uses of its Stal" Trek characters and situations. Varying pli\":lte responses, whether based Oil
economic calculations or a concern for corporate "image," furtllcr increase the arbitrariness and uncertainty of cop}right law as a whole.

a
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ments of outrageousness or defamation are likely to be biased. We
could decide that arbitrariness, in the sense of random enforcement
that falls like lightning from the sky, is not constitutionally troubling
in a speech regulation. But then we have substantially revised the concept of subjectivity, locating its harm in heuristic biases that subtly and
routinely lead most people to judge in ways t.hat can be predicted
based on who is speakip.g and who is being attacked.71
Defined in this way, the problem of systematic bias is still present
in copyright. Sympathetic plaintiffs are far more likely to have their
rights expansively defined than unattractive plaintiffs. Thus, lovable
Mickey Mouse gets lots of protection from a countercultural portrayal
when Disney sues a small comic book publisher over its scandalous
parody,72 while Howard Hughes has to lump it when a legitimate publisher publishes an unfavorable biography,73 Copyright losers are often artists making unconventional art that attempts to mock or satirize society, or social- critics using the expression of powerful 01'
popular people for their own purposes. AltllOugh this group would
not qualify for special protection from non-speech related laws, free
speech's concern for protecting the oddball and the unpopular
speaker applies here. In any event, the uncertainty and arbitrariness
of the ideal expression distinction make it a poor candidate to defend
copyright against a First Amendment challenge.

2. Fair Use
The 1976 Copyright Act codified previous judicial doctrine iuto a
statutory exception for fair use of copyrighted materials as a defense
to a finding of infringement. 74 The statute suggests four factors for
deciding fair use claims: the nature of the copyrighted work; the purpose and character of the use, including wheth(!r it is commercial 01'
noncommercial; the amount and substantiality of the use in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use on the
market for the copyrighted work. Though the law allows courts to
consider other factors, in practice they usually rely on the enumerated
four. Fair use preserves ground for some use of and comment on

71 The Supreme Court has held that subjective employment practices ClIll be suspect
when they appear to cover for systematic biases. See Watson v. Fort Worth BlIlIk & TI'IISI,
487 U.S. 977,1000 (1987).
72 See Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 758.
73 See Rosemont Enters, Inc. v. Random HOllse, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cil'. 1966).
74 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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copyrighted works, and courts and scholars generally agree that it
therefore protects First Amendment interests.75
The "nature of the copyrighted work" factor allows courts to give
more protection to fanciful works than to factual ones, preserving
public access to facts and opinions about the world while fencing off
the content of romance novels and police dramas.76 .As a free speech
protector, this factor is particularly well-suited to a l\'leiklejohnian theory of central political speech and peripheral entertaining speech.
The "nature" factor also allows courts to further First Amendment
interests in remaining silent by protecting unpublished works from
copying 'without good justification.77
The "purpose and character of the use" factor enables courts to
give more weight to uses that serve some greater good than uses that
are simply made for the copier's convenience. Educational or newsreporting uses receive more favor than pure entertainment. "Transformative" uses such as parody also get more leeway. In addition,
courts also favor noncommercial uses under this factor, on the theory
that someone who is not making money from a use is less likely to be
a venal thief.78 The "amount and substantiality" factor protects uivial
and incidental uses from liability. The "effect on the market" fhctor, in
some versions at least, protects uses that do not really hurt the copyright owner, so that speech is not resu"icted unless the resu'iction prevents an identifiable harm . .All this, copydght's defenders argue, supports First Amendment interests in the free flow of speech by limiting
the scope of copyright.
75 See, e.g., New Era Publ'ns Int'l Y. Henry Holt &: Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir.
1989); Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.
1982); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. Y. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957.
960 (D.N.H. 1978); Denicola, supra note 16, at 293-99: Pcrlman &: Rhinclandcr, supra notc
1, at 394.
i6 See, e.g., Stewart Y. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990); if. Blasi, slIpra notc 57, al553
(arguing that the First Amendment should ,igorously protcct facts, though ~somehow wc
ha"e come to think of the passionate, oftcn uninformed, soapbox orator as thc classic
embodiment of our commiunent to di\'ersity").
ii See Halper & ROlll, Pllblishers, IIlC., 471 U.S. at 558.
is On the other hand, preferring noncommcrcial works arguably docs lillie to promote First Amendment goals, because most "idcly disseminatcd works arc donc for profit
C\'en when they also have a news reporting or public debatCoenhancing purposc: thc NnL'
l'llrh Times does not come for free. See, e.g.. Rosemont Entcrs.• Inc. \'. Rmldom Housc, Inc••
366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966). Ifwe acccpt the basic idea that one mn promotc speech
by harnessing the profit motive to encourage speech production, thcn an c.-.ccssi\·c emphasis on the noncommcrciality of a use, dcfined as thc absencc of profit-sccking. conld
actually conflict "ith the proper understanding of the relationship betwecn cop}1ighl and
the FrrstAmendment. See illfra notes 226-237 and accompan}ing tcxt.
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a. Vagueness
One significant problem with fair use is similar to the problem
with the idea/expression dichotomy: It is too vague to providc
enough guidance. 79 Even those who believe that fair use serves First
Amendment purposes recognize its "infinite dasticity."Bo There arc
four named factors, but the statute suggests that the list is not exclu~
sive, and there is little guidance for how to weigh one against anothCl~
Mter decades of litigation, it is stilI difficult to tell when and whethcr
one can photocopy copyrighted materials, even for scientific l'e~
search.s1 Inconsistencies are common in copyright cases, where factspecific analyses combined with the multifactor fair use test make
cases almost impossible to categorize. Because the outcome of any
particular case is uncertain, a potential infringer/fair user has to be
willing to bear the substantial costs of litigation for a chance to escape
liability. This seems quite likely to prompt self-censorship.B2
See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrille, 101 HARV. L. IU:v. 16(i!,
1692-94 (1988);Jessica Litman, Reforming bljonnation Law in t'.:opyrighl's Image, 22 U. DA\'TON L. REv. 587, 612 (1997) [hereinafter, Litman, Refonlling illjorlllation Law]; Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Fairs Fair: A Commellt 011 the Fair Use DoclJille, 103 I-IARV. L. IU:v. 11!i7, 1137
(1990); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 4 FORm-lAM L. REv. 12!)1 (1999): Wang, slIpm note 'Hi,
at 1176-77.
80 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1106-07
(1990).
81 See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 «(jth Ch~
1996); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Ch~ 19!H); Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973); Duffy v. Pcnguin Books, .. F.
Supp.2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Television Digest, Inc. v. United Statcs Tel. Ass'n, 8,11 F.
Supp.5 (D.D.C. 1993); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp.1522
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
82 See Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property ami SlIbjects (if Politics: 1ntellt'cI//(11 Property
Laws a1ld Democratic Dialoglle, 69 TEXAS L. REv. 1853, 1867-68 (1991) [hcreinafter Coolllbe,
Objects ofProperty]; Litman, Reformillg bljo/'matioll Law, supra now 79, at 612-13.
My favorite piece of evidence that fair use is not carrying its spccch.protective
weight comes from a 1997 pamphlet distributed by Kinko's. The guide informs the readel'
that copyrighted materials may not be reproduced by anyone ,\ithout pcrmission from the
copyright ownel: FOrlunately, Kinko's provides a "Copyright/Trademark Pel'mission Itt...
quest Form." Assuming the cllstomer can find the copyright owncr, Kinko's will fax the
form to any United States location for free. The cllstomer is to chcck all intcnded IISCS f()l'
the copy, from a list of the following: "Personal," "News Reporting," "Scholal'ship/Rl'"
search," "Commercial," "Comment/Criticism," "Teaching," and ·Scan into COIIIPlltcl~"
CopyiTlg Guideli1les (1997) (pamphlet).
This form is a perfectly rational response to unccrtainty. The pCI'mission f01'1II
identifies some fair use favorites, such as research and criticism, but only so that the copyright owner can decide whether or not to withhold permission. Thcrc is no indication thaI
"Comment/Criticism" might justify copying withollt permission. Now, maybc the government cannot be held responsible for this distortion, though First Amendmcnt libel law
thinks so; maybe the well-known fact that the average copy shop ignorcs what happcns lit
79
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b. Fair Use and ContentDisaimination

Control of even one copyright can allow an owner to choke off
democratic dialogue, if that copylight is very important for full discussion of a particular issue of public interest. Courts thus sometimes
particularize the "purpose of the use" factor of the fair use test: Not
just any news reporting or scholarship evokes a public interest test,
but this report is important enough to justif.}, stretching the boundalies of fair use.83 The public interest test only increases the l.111Certainty generated by fair use. Apparently, it is in tlle public intcrcst to
find out more about Howard Hughes,&! but not about Lenny BruceSS
or Rudolph Valentino;86 "who shotJFK" but not "who shotJ.R" Thc
public interest test also requires suspect content judgmcnts about thc
quality or value of the allegedly infringing work.87
Even without the public interest subfactor, one might wonder
whether fair use is unconstitutional because it discriminates on tlle
basis of content. Fair use favors copying, even pure copying, for educational and news l-eporting purposes. The Supreme Court, evaluating an anticounterfeiting law tllat prohibited certain reproductions of
images of currency but made exceptions for newsworthiness or cducaits self-service copiers blunts the force of the pamphlet'S blankct assertions. BUI if rhir use
is supposed to sen'e Ftrst Amendment goals, thcre should be some indication that it actually does so in practice, not just in theory.
83 See, e.g., RosemontElIters., 366 F.2d at 307; Berlin \'. E.C. Publ'ns, 329 F.2d 5·n, 544
(2d Cir. (964). Paul Goldstein has gh'cn particular allention to thc risks of cop}Tight monopoly. A large corporation may own a number of intcrlocking cop)Tights, and bc able to
leverage them to e.xert undue market powcr. In such a case, he suggests, antimonopoly
principles are First Amendment priuciples. Sec Goldstein, slIpra notc 2, at 987.1043.
84 See Rosemollt Enters., 366 F.2d at 303.
85 See Man1n Worth Prods. \'. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.\~ 1970).
S6 Sec Rohauerv. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.\~ 1974). As Celia Goldwag points out, "It is not the merits of the court's assessment of the relath'e values of
Hughes and Valentino but the subjecti\'e nature of its calculation that is disturbing." Goldwag, supra note 17, at 19.
s; See V{endy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failllre: .11 Strtltlllmi ami &ollomit .tbla/ysis oj
tlle Betall/ax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L RE,'. 1600, 1637 (1982). E\'ell analysIS
who disagree \\ith Gordon's economic focus somctimcs cndorse a public interest test that
makes quality judgments about challenged works:
Most would agree that the Zaprudcr film adds more to the democratiC' dialogue than do the Sunday comics. Likc\\ise, a more limitcd public intercst in
cartoon characters or posters of checrlcadcrs warrants a more limited application of the fair use doctrinc, and thus grcatcr hesitancy in limiting the
rights of the copyright holder on first amcndmcnt grounds.
Stephen S. Zimmerman, A Regulat0T)' ThcoT)' o/Co/J)'ligllJ: Jh'oidillg a First .111111'1/(1111(111 Colljlicl,
35 EMORY LJ. 163, 197 (1986) (fOOUlOtes omittcd).
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tional value, found that these exceptions were impermissibly contentbased.88 There seems to be no reason that the exceptions would lose
their content-based nature when applied to copyright .
. Fair use also favors criticism and parody. Reviewers get leeway, as
do users who humorously savage an original. These preferences are
justified on the perfectly reasonable grounds that copydght owners
have non-profit-based reasons to prevent uses Illat are cdtical of the
original work.89 In essence, fair use contains an analogue to the "right
of reply" statute struck down in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo. 9o Tornillo invalidated a statute tllat allowed people who had
been criticized in a newspaper a chance to respond on the same editorial pages. Anyone who had not first been criticized would have to
pay to take out an ad or convince the editors to carry his or her viewpoint. Like citizens covered by a right of reply statute, fair users have a
special privilege to copy a work so long as they are criticizing what
came before. They may use another's property-·a copyrighted workwithout tlle owner's consent, just as a person criticized by the Miami
Herald could use its printing press and newsprint without the owner's
consent. If they do not disagree with the work, hOWeVelj their use may
trigger an obligation to pay,just like any other c()nsumer/speakel~
Such protection for uses the copyright owner finds particularly
objectionable evokes the taint of compelled affirmation, having one's
property used to endorse a message with which one resolutely disagrees. 91 It also seems to conflict with the Court's pronouncement ill
Hurley v. Irish-American Ga)~ Lesbian and Bisexual Group that a speake1"s
own speech cannot be appropriated by the state as a public aCCOlllmodation.92 The Hurley Court held that the organizers of a 8t. Patrick's Day parade could not be forced by state anti-discrimination law
to allow marchers to display signs affirming their nonheterosexual
Irishness because that would change the expressive message of the
See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,648-49 (1984).
These reasons may also be profit-based, as criticism can destroy the market 101' II
work even though it is not a substitute for that work. Courts refuse to conside1' negative
press a cognizable harm, just as business lost by a restaurant when a competing rcstmmllli
opens up down the block wiII not be legally cognizable harm.
90 418 U.S. 241 (1974); if. Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at I'! (striking down II regulation
that awarded access to utility-company mailing envelopes to critics of the utilitics aud crltl·
cizing the regulation for awarding access "only to those who disolgree with appellant's vicws
and are hostile to appellant's interests").
91 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Ekc., 475 U.S. at 11 (plurality); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705 (1977); W. v.,. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnelte, 319 U.S. 624, (i42 (1943).
92 See515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995).
88
89
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parade contrary to the organizers' intent. Hurle)' might be distinguished from fair use because there is only one parade, whereas the
existence of a parody does not change the meaning of the original
work. But, just as the Court recognized that signs announcing gay and
lesbian identities would reflect on the meaning of the rest of the parade,93 the existence of a parody may well lead consumers to reevaluate the meaning of the original.94 Moreover, the point of copyright is
that it generally gives owners rights in copies, not just in physical
originals, so that a parody could fall within the scope of the author's
exclusive rights were it not for the content-based fair use exception.
The transformative (including critical or parodic) uses escape
court-backed prohibition because otherwise private owners would
prohibit expression they disliked. Against a background of generally
neutral copyright law, the government's hand appears to come between the speaker and the censor-but only if we accept that censorship can be carried on by private parties with state backing. And this
vision of government's role in the speech market, I will show below. is
precisely what justifies copyright as a whole. not simply the transfo1'mative use preference in fair use law.
B. Less Restlictive Alternatives

In general, regulations that restrict speech as such are required
to meet fairly stringent tests. Even when a compelling government
interest supports the regulation, courts seek to assure that 110 more
speech is suppressed than necessary.95 The appropriate inquiry, therefore, is not whether having copyright is important enough to outweigh First Amendment concerns, but whether the particular regime
we have is a good way of protecting authors without unnecessarily infringing First Amendment interests.
There is a standard free speech argument that applies here:
"more speech" and concerted action as a response to harmful
93 See id. ("[T)he communication produced by the pri\'ate organizers wonld be shaped
by all those ... who \\ished to join in \\ith some c.xprcssi\'e demonstration of their 0\\11.").
9t As Fred Schauer mites, he cannot look at Leonardo DaVinci's Mona Usa the same
way after haling seen the version \\ith a mustache added. SrI! Frederick Schauer, rile 011101·
01!J' of Censorship, in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION
147, 157 (Robert C. Post ed., 1998) [hereinafter Schauer, Olllolog),).
95 See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101n.8 (1972); United States \'. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-564 (1965); NAACP \'. Button, 3il
U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Cantwell \'. Connecticut, 310 U,S. 296, 307 (1940); Schlleiden'. State,
308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939); Dejonge\'. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937).
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speech. 96 Instead of regulating hate speech, for example, the targeted
group should toughen up. Free speech "absolutists" argue that tm'·
geted groups should overwhelm their opponents in the marketplace
of ideas by offering competing ideas, by educating the public that racism is bad.97 Groups can refuse to deal with people whose speech offends them, and lobby others to do the same.
The argument for self-help exists in copydght, though it is 110t
yet recognized as a free speech argument. There are numerous selfhelp mechanisms available for content providers who want to protect
original expression. For example, publishers could use contractnal
mechanisms to prohibit copying and seek damages against anyone
who violated the contract.98 They could also attempt to enforce anticopying norms by structuring the industry to allow authorized publishers lead time or other advantages, and punishing defectors with
retributive "strike" editions. 99 Content providers could deal only with
those who accepted their terms of service, which would include anticopying agreements. Digital watermarking and other copy-protection
technologies may allow content providers to defend their intellectual
property against quick copying just as a fence around a plot of laud
hinders easy trespass. lOO
This kind of self-help is likely to be significantly more effective
than standard "more speech" self-help. Contracts are more persuasive
as an inducement to respect copying rights than the aspiratiollal language of equality is as a reason to respect other people. Of course, the
96 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (holding that public
figures do not need the protection of expansive libel law bccmlsc they havc acccss to the
channels of communication to respond to attacks).
97 See V.'hiuley v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1926) (Brandcis,]., conctll'rlng),
98 See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Righls MallageJl/ellt 011
COpylighl's Fair Use DoctJiIll!, 76 N.C. L. REv. 557, 577 (1998); see also Hcmy H. 1)c1'l'ilt,JI~,
Property alld ImlOllatiolt ill the Global bljonllatioll Illfrastructure, 1996 U. CIII. LEGAl. F. 261,
283-85. Landes and Posner point out that the benefits of contractual anticopying pro\'i.
sions will vary greatly depending on how widely the work needs to be distributcd to guarantee a return to the publisher and whether the work will be resold or publicly pcrforlllcd.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 330. Thus, contractual provisions will not be particu.
larly useful to some kinds of content providers. But the variable sU'ength of contmctual
copying restrictions would, in a copylight-free world, shift content providel's' production
to creative works tllat could be easily protected using contractual and othcl' sclf.hdp
mechanisms; that the mb,;: of works would change does not necessarily mcall that cl'('alive
expression would disappear or even decrease on the \"hole.
99 See Gordon, An Inquiry into Ihe Alelils, supra note 17, at 1401; if. Cathcrinc Grccn·
man, Taking Sides in the Napsler mlr, N,Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2000. at El (discussing scll:hdp
measure of putting distorted "cuckoo's egg" music files on free file-sharing scrvices).
100 See gellerally Bell, supra note 98.
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private contract regime would still depend on the st.'lte as back-up,
and so might seem to raise similar First Amendment problems, but at
least no one would be able to control others' use of speech without
. their prior consent to the seller's terms. Futhermore, general private
property and contract law, like that which protects printing presses,
computer servers, and other enabling mechanisms of speech, would
not be regulation specifically targeted at speech.101
As the cable industry does, content providers could also run public education campaigns against the theft of intellectual property, encouraging people to buy only .£i·om authorized providers and educating the public about how to determine if a book is an original or a
knockoff.I°2 Noncontractual, self-help measures based purely on persuasion are available.I03 One example is shareware, software that is
provided for free by the creator. Users m'e asked to pay a fee if tile)'
decide to continue to use the product after trying it out Shm'cwarc
thrives today, even though only an estimated ten percent of users accede to this moral suasion.lO-! It might decrease profits, but the First
Amendment arguably imposes certain costs on speakers, like the costs
of developing a persuasive countel':.message to unpleasmlt speech.
Given that there are ways for private actors to protect original
content through voluntm·y transactions, the government arguably
does not have a compelling interest in restricting speech tIlrough
copyright. Yet a regime of self-help might be bad for readers mId
speakers in a variety of ways, as technical mld contt-actual remedies
would not have the same leeway for de minimis uses as tile copyright
101 Maybe, though, effectiveness is not the point. Maybe incffccti\'e counterspeech is
constitutionally relevant. but effective countermeasures are mainl}' technical or \c.-g:ll. not
speech themselves, and so they do not count. Yet contract :lnd other fonns of economic
self-help have strong expressive components: the ob\ious message of:l refusal to deal (or
for that matter, of a password-protected system) is "do ",hall wanl or you may not ha\'C my
business." See Suzanne Sangree, Title W[ Prohibitiolls '\gaillsl Hostile EIIl,irollllltlll &xl/n/lInrassmellt and tile First AmClldmCllt: No Collisioll in Siglit, 47 RUTGERS L. RE\'. 461. 524 n.288
(1995). Moreover, if effectiveness does not mauer, then the possibility of counterspeech
was a red herring from the beginning, covering up :ljudgment that certain speech cannot
be suppressed no matter how harmful it is and how impossible it is to counter.
102 See Macrovision Corporation ColltillUes [Is Support of The L\lIli·Tllrjl Cable Task Foree, Bus.
WIRE, Feb. 13, 1998, allailable in LEXIS, Ne.xis Library, Curnws File.
103 Commentators have suggested many speech-bascd ways to make speech Illore enticing to convince consumers to choose a particular source, such :IS delh'ering it f."lSter or
more attractively, in order to maintain their market shares in the absence of cop)Tight. Stt,
e.g., Breyer, supra note 4, at 281; Gordon, Au IIIquiry' illto Ihe Mrrits, supra note 17,:lt 1401;
Perritt, supra note 98, at 283-85.
l().l See Trotler Hardy, Propert), (alld CojJ)"ight) ill Y'bmpacc, 1996 U. CIlI. LEGAL F. 21i,
222.
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law, nor would they likely distinguish between fair and unfair use 01'
the use of a work's idea rather than its expression. lOo Contract and
technological countermeasures, therefore, might well impede the free
flow of information contrary to constitutional ideals. Note, hOWeVClj
that the claim that copyright serves content users' speech interests
better than the se1f.he1p alternative appeals to First Amendment val·
ues as such, not to a non-speech compelling government interest.
C. Speech as Property

One final way to solve the First Amendment problem is to
redefine the ground rules: to say that it is property, not speech, at is·
sue)06 Copyright, the argument goes, recognizes the natural right of
the creator to control and profit from his creation. The authol' brings
the work into the world, creating it out of nothing, or out of the raw
materials of experience, and is thus entitled to dispose of that which
he has made, like Lear with his children.
If copyrightable speech is property, then copyright may no longer
need a free speech justification. Courts occasionally say that it would
be unfair to make a defendant pay for the material it used, because
tlIat would h1:lrt free speech interests. 107 In standard First Amencltnellt
contexts, however, it is unremarkable that a person may need to pay

SeeJulie E. C?hen, A Right To Read Anonymollsly: A C/os,~r Look at "CoPYright Mallagl,"
in C)'berspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 981, 997-98, 1021-22 (1996); Litman, Reformillg 111Jormalion Law, supra note 79, at 601-02; Perritt, supra note 118, at 302. Bcll argucs that
105

IIIC/lt"

automated use licensing will benefit users, because "fair use never comes fOJ' frce." Bcll,
supra note 98, at 580. Consumers incur search costs looking for information aud OPPOI'tllnity costs when they photocopy, clip, or type quotes into their signature filcs. lIt- llJ'gllcs
that automated rights management will reduce such transaction costs, thus giving' till' COli"
SlimeI' a net benefit despite the addition of a previollsly unnecessary paymcnt to thc rop)'"
right owner. See id. The conceptual flaw in Bell's reasoning is that if copyright owncl's
could not charge for fair uses, consumers' net benefit would be much largeI'; the facl that
they would retain some benefits if they had to pay does not prove that rights l11anagcllll'lIt
is a good deal for them. (Arguably, many copyright owners will not allow theit- contellt to
be made available electronically without rights management, but this is an empirical qlll'g.
tion whose answer is unknown.) Moreovel; anyone who uses Yi1l1001, LEXIS, OJ' a ,"'l'iety of
other electronic search engines is painfully aware that the new technology'S eITerts 011
search costs are uncertain at best. If the technology allows more charges by copyright owners but does not improve substantially for users, it will be a bad bargain.
106 Cf NixOII, 120 S. Ct. at 905 (Stevens,j., concurring).
107 See Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.
Fla. 1978); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Ceis, 293 F. Supp. 130 (S,D.N.V. 1968).
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to speak. in a particular way-to take out an ad in the papel; to print
pamphlets, and so on.1°8
In this vision, fair use is not a necessary part of copyright; thc
First Amendment has nothing to say about a requirement that a person has to payor get an owner's consent before she can e}.'}Jl"css hcr-.
self in a particular way.109 The government is simply barred from preventing 'willing sellers and buyers from making deals. l1O The First
Amendment and the Copyright Clause are in harmony bccause one
protects information against government suppression and the other
protects it against "private depredation. "lll Moreo\,el; absolute property rules, under which any interference with rights can be elyoincd
and punished, are more appropriate than liability rules, under which
a rights violator only has to pay for the value of what he took.ll2
Such a theory comes at the price of a good deal of what generally
seems valuable about free speech. In fact, the state's refusal to intervene in the distribution of material goods in aid of fi..ee speech may
only be palatable because speakers can choose fairly £i'cel), £i'om the
universe of ideas and expression. Jack Balkin points out that, if the
government chose to close all public fora, leaving speakers to ncgotiate in the private market for space in which to speak, many people
would sense a First Amendment difficulty. us

108 CJ. Loyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,570 (1972) (holding that a lando\\1u,'r may
exclude unwanted speakers from his land).
109 See Richard A Posner, mu.'n Is Parody Fair (~!'r, 21J. LECAL STUD. 67, 73 (1992) (arguing that the fair use defense should ne\'er be available for satiric uses because Was we do
not suppose that writers should be allowed to stcal paper and pencils in order to reduce
the cost of satire, neither is there a compelling rcason to subsidize social criticism byallowing writers to use copyrighted materials ,,;thout compensating the cop}right holder}.
110 SeeJohn O. McGinnis, The Ollce alld Futurt! Proprrt)'-Basrd ''isioll of tile First AWl'I/timmt,
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 49, 84-85 (1996).
111 See ide at 79.
.
112 See Hardy, supra note 104, at 217.1 disagrce ,,;th Hardy on many points, notlcast of
which is his decision to remO\'c sC\'eral factors that fa\'or latitude for copiers, snch as the
non-profit-based incentives that people ha\'c to producc speech, from his calculus of
rights, See ide at 221. Hardy discounts the c.xtcnt to whicll authors usc others' works to spur
their own creativity, assuming instead that a persoll who \\;shcs to restrict access to his work
to paying parties is making a choice that only aITccts his 0"11 incenth'cs and ability to crt....
ate. Hardy also gives the game away by restricting his analysis to situations in which cop)ing
is not amenable to a fair use analysis. See ide at 241. Dcciding whether or not r.,ir use applies often imposes a large transaction cost on its 0\\11; the difficulty of detcrmining r.,ir
use in ad\'allce would justity a liability rulc, particularly when a copier acted in good r.,ith
and mistook the limits of fair usc,
113 See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Lrgal Rralist Llpproachrs to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE LJ. 375, 400.
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The property rights argument depends on certain unsound assumptions about the appropriate subjects and scope of ownership,lH
It takes as a foundation the idea that government is supposed to PI'Otect my property, and that such protection does not count as "inteI'vention" into the market or the private sphere. 115 But this finesses the
question of how information is converted into property. Why is something less "my own" if I did not think it up, so long as I said it, or
made my own copy?116 Implicit in the argument is a modified "sweat
of the brow" theory-information is mine if I worked to CI'eate it, and
did not copy too much in the process.
The sweat of the brow theory is highly troublesome as a
justification for anything like our current copyright regime. Not only
has the Supreme Court rather resoundingly rejected it,117 sweat of the
brow does not explain why facts and ideas are not copyrightable. In

ij]ust as a legal realist might argue that economic liberty is more than the
right to sign contracts of adhesion, we understand that exprcssive libcrty is
not simply the right to make noises in the air directed to no onc in particular.... Effective communication, or rather its substantivc possibility, is lilt unavoidable component of the liberty of speech,just as eJIcctivc bargaining, or
its substantive possibility, is an essential component of e( onomic libcrty.

Id. at40l.
114 The economic modeling of the market for information faces a tl'Oubling conceptual problem: The perfectly functioning market assumes perfcct information. But whl'n
information is itself a marketable commodity, how can tltcre bc frcely circulating full information in the perfect market? Information does not fit wdl in thc markct model bt"
cause it is a condition of the market's existence. SeeJames Boyle, A Theory of Law aI/(II"fol~
mation: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, alld Insidern'adillg, 80 CAl. L. REv. Jt113, 1420, 1,14348 (1992). As a result, a purely property-based vision of information wiII misdcscribc the
way information exchange actually works.
115 See McGinnis, supra note 110, at 85 n.149, 123.
116 Wendy Gordon has recently offered a property theory that trics to avoid these problems by incorporating restraints on what authors may appropriatc, using the Lockean 1'1'0viso that an appropriator must leave "as much and as good" for later takers, Set'Wendy J,
Gordon, A Property Right ill SelfExpressioll: Equality atlli IllllifJillualislll ill Ihe Nall/l'lIl Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE LJ. 1533 (1993) [hereinafter Gordon, A Properly Righi ill S('/}
E:..pressionJ. She believes that this approach accommodates free spccch concel'ns without
requiring explicit application of the First Amendment. See id. at 1539. The restmints she
would impose look a lot like the idealexpression distinction and the fair use defl'llsl',
though, and thus her property theory, while it avoids my criticisms of stmldard PI'OPl'I'ty
theories, does not in my opinion adequately answer First Amendmcnt questiolls IIbout
cop}Tight.
117 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). The COIu't hilS
generally maintained that copyright is a creature of statute, not natlll'al !'ight. St'e SOllY
Corp. v, Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) ("The protectioll given to
copyrights is wholly statutory. "); id. at 429-30 11.10 ("Copyright is not based UpOll any lIatural right the author has. ").
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theory, my idea is no less my O'wn than my expression. Both are embodied in a creative work, and my idea may be far more valuable. One
answer is that tracing the source of ideas (and facts) can be too
difficult, and it is cost-unjustified for the law to allow suits for anything
but copying expression. ll8 Even if this did not sound like a just-so
story, we do have a relevant example of an intellectual property regime that does not capitulate to tracing difficulties: patent law. The
first inventor of an idea or discoverer of a fact could be protected in
similar fashion.
The property vision also cannot explain the peculim- lights that
copyright allows authors, such as the right to contI'ol derivative works,
even if those works would otherwise be independently copylight.1.ble;
tlle right to control public performmlces; and tI'Ulslation and
abridgement rights.1l9 In all tllese cases, otller people may do as much
or more work to bring new expression into tlle world, but tlleir work
does not count. Their children are illegitimate. Moreover, tlle property rights theory makes the limited duration of copyright pm·ticulm·ly
hard to explain. Houses (and paper and ink) do not revert to a common pool after an owner has had contI'ol of tllem for a cert.1.in period
of time. "If I may own Blackacre in perpetuity, why not also Black
Beaut)'?"120 The standard defense of limited duration from tllis perspective is tllat, eventually, tracing tlle cop}'light proprietor "ill become impossible. But surely tllis is only because tlle duration of copyright is limited: If it were unlimited, tlle market would generate
institutions that could find owners,just as it is possible to find out who
owns any particular piece of Imld. Plenty of permissions orgmlizations
already exist, such as ASCAP, BMI, and tlle Cop}'light Clem-ance Center, There is no reason from a property perspective tlmt anything once
in their catalogs has to be set free.1 21
But a property rights entllUsiast could agree with all tllese criticisms, and argue tllat these limits should be abolished. Greater consistency would cause greater First Amendment concerns, tllOugh, mId
would still not answer tough questions about tlle scope of owner-

See McGinnis, supra note 110, at 83.
See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973) ("[TJhcrc is no fixctl, immutable line to tell us which 'human productions' are privatc properly and which arc so gemeral as to become 'free as the air."'); Stephen M. McJohn, Fair ({fe alld Privali:.Lllioll ill CoPJright, 35 SAN DIEGO L. RE\'. 61, 80-84 (1998) (arguing that an)' coppightctl work contains
noncopyrightable elements that a property rights approach is iIl-cquippctl to idcntify).
120See Nimmer, Cop)'right, supra note 16, at 1193.
121 See McJohn, supra note 119, at 77-78.
118

119
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ship.122 Even if transaction costs are generally low in cyberspace, it will
remain just as difficult to distinguish idea from expression or dete..~
mine substantial similarity in bytes as it is on the printed page,123
In addition, as Eugene Volokh and Brett McDonnell point out,
any interest can be reconceptualized as a property interest to defeat a
speech claim.l 24 Your right to swing your fist ends at my face, but the
law can define how far my "face" extends. There is no particulal' rea~
son the law could not give me a property interest in physical and mental integrity that could be violated by exposure to pornography; no
reason, that is, but the First Amendment as it is now understood.

D. Conclusion
This pai·t examined standard justifications for copyright against
free speech challenges. The usual suspects-the ideal expression dis~
tinction and fair use-attempt to provide a justification that does not
depend on copyright's speech-enhancing role. Unfortunately, neither
idealexpression nor fair use bear the necessary weight, primarily be~
cause they are too vague to provide a speech user with any real cer~
tainty about what she may say.l25 There are also less restrictive alterlla~
tives to copyright as we know it that would not require nearly as much
overt state intervention further weakening the conventional case for
copyright. And, the proposal to assimilate speech law in its entirety to
property law is ultimately incapable of avoiding the difficult questions
122 See David Fewer, CoT/stitutioT/alizing Copyright: Freedolll of Expression ami Ihe Li1llils oj
Copyrif!Jlt in Canada, 55 U. TORONTO FAc. L. REv. 175, 187-88 (1997) (noting' that natuml
property rights concepts of copyright gloss over the dependence of authors on othc!'!!'
expression).
123 Cf. Hardy, supra note 104, at 219 (arguing that low tmn$actioll costsjustify choosing'
property rules over liability rules for copyright).
124 See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 57, at 24,15-46; see also Eugene Volokh & Mark
Lemley, Freedolll oj Speech a1ld Inju1IctioT/s in Intellectllal Property Cases, 48 DUK~ LJ. 147
(1998) (noting that a bill introduced in Congress would have declared the Unitcd Statcs
flag to be copyrighted and defined flag·burning and desecration as infringement).
125 As several commentators have noted, the existence of two apparently quite difter·
entjustifications for finding copyright protection consistent with the First Amendment has
also caused practical difficulties. The contraction of each doctrine is justified by !'cassul'ing'
free speech partisans that the other doctrine is still available, so First AlJlendmcnt concerns do not receive serions consideration. See Jessica Litman, Copytight (lml Illj01'1I1ll1i1J1l
PoliC)~ LAw & CONTEIIIP. PROBS. 185, 204-06 (1992) [hereinafter, Litm;\II, Copyright (///(1
l1iformation Policy); Netanel, supra note 63, at 303. One answer 10 this problem might be to
make a First Amendment analysis an explicit part of copyright decisions, rathel' thnn claim<
ing that fair use and idea/expression are themselves sufficient. See NIMM~It. FR~~DOM m'
SPEECH, supra note 15, § 2.05[C), at 2-73; Denicola, sllpra note 16, nt 304-06; Litman,
CopYlight aT/d Injol1llation Policy, supra, at 208; Wang, supra note '16, at 1159, 1177.
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of how far to extend ownership of intellectual creation.I 2G And yet it
seems inconceivable that copyright could be unconstitutional, since it
serves such an important public interest. Nor has my aim been to
suggest that copyright is unconstitutional. R.1.ther, its constitutionality
depends on the fact that the government interest underlying copyright is the promotion of speech.
ll.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT FOR COPYRIGHT

.A.

HOllJ

Copylight Serves First Amendment 11ilues

When the conflict between free speech and copyright 'was first
theorized, the natural response 'was that the e>..rpressive and communicative interests involved in copyright protection were constitutionally
cognizable. Therefore, every recent discussion of copylight and free
126 One might also argue that appl}ing First Amendment principles is unnccessary in
coppight because the Framers took free speech into account when they \\Tote the Constitution. As a matter of constitutional history, this claim is debatable at best. Copyright was
first developed as a tool of official ccnsorship. ~ MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNF.RS 12,
15 (1993); Pattcrson, supra note 14, at 3. Thc presence of the Copyright Clause was one
factor in the inclusion of the First Amendmcnt in the Bill of Rights. because antiFederalists feared that cop}Tight could be used to reward fa\'ored authors and punish disfavored ones. See Fraser, supra note 17, at 19-20 & n.126. Furthermore. the claim thatlhe
Constitution already balanced free speech interests against coppight does not appear to
distinguish the Cop}Tight Clausc from any other part of the Constitution. such as the
Commerce Clause. See NIMMER, FREEDOr.1 OF SPEECH, supra note 15. § 2.05[C] at 2-57.
The existence of thc Cop)Tight Clausc certainly does not imply that the Copyright Act as it exists now comports '\ith thc First Amendment as it c.xists now. Modem
spcech thcory itself is rather young, constitutionally speaking. Str, {'.g.. Schenk \~ United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs Y. Unitcd States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). Before the First
Amendment was applied against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, stl'GitIow
Y. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), "ery few pcople thought to challenge long..,cceptetl
practices such as bans on blasphemy, obscenity, libel, and politically sub\'crsh'c speech. On
its side, cop}Tight has expandcd substantiaIly in reccnt years. The demise of thc registration requirement has made cop}Tight easier to obt.,in and harder for a potential user to
determine. The cop)Tight term has doubled and redoubled. The media coveretl by copyright law have expanded to include new forms and some older ones, such as newspapers,
that were previously considered too cphcmeral to warrant cop}Tight protection. Perfonnanee, translation, and dcrivati\·c rights havc becn added to the original replication rights,
ghing to the copyright mmer the sole right to authorize adaptations and reworkings that
were once up for grabs. See, e.g., Stowe Y. Thomas, 23 F. c."lS. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853); Folsom Y. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). As both kinds of information polityexpand their scope, it is 110t surprising that thcy would collide.
Another important point about tIle claim that the CoP}Tighl Clause itselr does
the free speech balancing job is that it finesses a crucial question of institutional competence. The claim is not really that thc CIa liSt! balances free speech concerns \\ith other
goals, but that Congress does ill the cop}Tight law it enacts. I take up thc issue of congressional balancing in Part III. See i7lfra notes 217-251 and accompan}ing tc.xt.
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speech calls attention to the Supreme Court.'s pronouncement in
Harper & Rmv, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterplises: "The Framers intended copyright itself to be an engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to use one's expression, copyright supplies
the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas. "127 While the
Court was at the time mainly concerned with copyright's furtherance
of the First Amendment privilege not to speak,128 its language has
generally been taken to have wider import, covering copyright's
speech-productive incentives as well)29 In a leading treatise on freedom of speech, Professor Nimmer takes the same position. He concludes that, though expression ordinmily deserves protection from
government suppression, the idealexpression dichotomy is justified
by the counter-speech value of encouraging authorship.Iso That is, a
speech-promoting regulation can justifiably snppress more speech
than a regulation with a permissible but non-speech-promotillg
aim)31
When government enforces copyright, it encourages a broad,
diverse array of publicly available ideas and expressions, a core interest underlying the First Amendment.182 Free speech values, then, support affirmative government action to encourage speech by harnessing the power of the market. The marketplac(~ is 110t just a forum
where ideas compete for dominance, but a literal (if not always liter127 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). The contention that the Framers held this belief Is
probably wrong, given copyright's historical connection to censorship. Sec Frusel; slIpm
note 17, at 19-20.
128 See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 559.
129 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 63, at 289.
130 See NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 15, § 2.05[C], at 2-66 11.18'1: set' (lisa
Goldstein, supra note 2, at 990.
131 Cf. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 120 S. Ct. 13'16, 1357-58 (2000)
(Souter, j., concurring) (students' First Amendment objection to activity fcc was leS$ persuasive because the purpose of the fee was to increase speech): Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 92-93 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding publicly financed campaign subsidies becaus/!
they facilitated First Amendmen t self.governmen t goals).
132 The Association of American Publishers expressed the point with understandable
firmness:

Freedom of expression is meaningless unless works arc created and distributed... , [T]he copyright law assures that there is opportunity for 1'{'COUp"
ment of the intellectual and financial investment of authors and publishers,
that their creative efforts arc maintained, and that their works arc made aV<liI·
able to the public. It is essential to the purpose of the First Amendment,
Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Publishers, Inc., supra note 1 (footnote
omitted); see also Goldwag, supra note 17, at 23: Shipley, supra note 17, :It 986-87; WlIng.
supra note 46, at 1177.
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ary) marketplace where ideas get traded for money. "\"l'J.tat the "engine
of free expression" argument means, simply enough, is that there are
First Amendment interests on both sides of a copyright case. The
plaintiff complaining about copying upholds the public interest insofar as a prohibition on copying preserves creators' incenth'es to put
creative material in the marketplace, just as the defendant upholds
the public interest insofar as copying is necessary to enable broad access to information.
The full argument that there are First Amendment interests on
both sides presupposes that the extent to which a speaker is heard is a
constitutionally relevant fact. 133 Being heard is crucial to a speaker.
The government cannot require speakers to speak in the middle of
the night on an island off the mainland even if it prO\ides speakers
free transportation there. Speech values are harmed when government acts in ways that substantially impair speakers' ability to communicate. Thus, copyright aids free speech because "[e]ffecti\'e dissemination of creative work costs money. "1M
Free speech theory sometimes seems to imagine a nation of
speakers each yammering into a void. Copyright, by contrast, emphasizes the communal nature of creati,ity and speech. People only share
their ideas because there is an audience, and copyright is limited because speakers depend on what was said before. Correspondingly, listeners are entitled to speech rights because tlley may choose to adopt
tlle messages tllat others are sending and also because tlleir varying
interpretations may enrich our shared dialogue as much or more than
the original message. The speech-interests-on-botll-5ides argument
asserts that preserving a market share for speakers is constitutionally
relevant because speakers often need an incentive to speak. If tlle
government refuses to enforce copyright, tlle mm'ket for ideas \\ill
end up impoverished.
B. Implications Jor GeneralFree Speech Docllillt!

Copyright is not a constitutional mlomaly. There are a series of
areas in which First Amendment interests may be served by resu'icting
and channeling speech. The reasons for government regulation are
different, but they are analogous. To have a healtllY, dynmnic system
of speech, tllere must be certain architectural limits on tlle system
133 CJ. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisc.xual Group, 515 U.s. 557, 568
(1995) (noting that a parade's expressive content is meaningless if no one sees it).
1M 'Wang, supra note 46, at 1178.
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that shape what occurs therein. 135 Many people agree with this claim.
as applied to property rights, but not to speech; intellectual property,
which bridges the gap between the two, shows that speech cannot es·
cape government structuring, because speech is often capable of sup·
pressing other speech.
One major purpose of my comparison of copyright and other
market failure or speech-versus-speech theories is to suggest that First
Amendment absolutists, who have busied themselves fending off 1'aeli·
cal attacks in areas such as campaign finance, s(~xual harassment, pornography, and hate speech, should be attending to the apparently
enormous exception to standard First Amendment doctrine embod·
ied in copyright. Copyright, after all, covers every single fixed piece of
expression,136 not just isolated areas of the universe of free speech.
But it is not unconstitutional, because its absence would be worse for
speech. Broad indictments of regulations designed to promote some
speech by controlling other kinds threaten to make copyright look
unconstitutional; this is a reason to reject those broad theories, 01' at
least to cabin them.
This section elaborates on the incentive arg·ument for copyl'ight,
explaining how it is properly described as a market failure theory that
enlists government to achieve a better balance of speech, and how
copyright's incentive structure has predictable effects on content. In
many cases of speech-versus-speech conflict, the market failure
identified can only be addressed by some form of regulation that can
be described as content-based. The question is not whether one has to
accept all such regulations if one accepts any, because there are rea·
sonable distinctions between the various kinds of market failures. Instead, my aim is to show that a basic problem of speech-versus-speech
underlies several important kinds of regulations and proposed regula·
tions, and that the case against them must not rely on the simple claim
that the government has to be kept out of the world of speech.
I want to be clear that I remain uncertain about the wisdom of
these various regulations. My understanding, howevel; is that many
people support copyright and oppose one or more of the other
speech regulations discussed in this section, usually without considering the relationship between those two positions, and I am interested
in whether that is a consistent stance. My sense is that one's concluSee, e.g., eass Sunstein, A New Dealfor Speech, 17 HASTINGS LJ. 137 (HJ!l4).
And a few unfixed; for example, one can infringe by publicly performing n cop),righted work even if the performance is not fixed.
1$5

136
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sion about whether copyright is fundamentally distinguishable from
other regulations depends mainly on one's beliefs about the e."dent to
which the First Amendment should invalidate laws that disproportionately burden the speech of disadvant<lged groups that are not
primarily defined by the content of their speech. The First Amendment, conventionally understood, regulates the conditions under
which the law may disfavor people based on their beliefs and their
speech (Communists, pornographers, copiers). But, at times, the disfavored categories precede the speech, and speech regulations only
have a disparate impact on people in those categories rather than
creating the categories. It is possible that the First Amendment is primarily concerned with laws that create a category of disfavored speakers, not laws that may enhance prior disadvanL.'lges by regulating
speech. Yet that First Amendment seems impoverished mId unrealistic
to me.1 37
1. The Basic Analogy Between Cop}'light and Other Mm·ket-FailureBased Speech Regulations

The argument for government intervention is not unique to
copyright. It is made by a number of prominent scholm-s discussing
pornography, sexual harassment, hate speech, cmnpaign finmlce, mId
new media.l38 For example, racist speech is said systematically to un-

13; For example, African Americans and Jews who were drmm to Communism were, in
part, responding to discrimination, while the racial and ethnic composition o[ the American Communist Party added extra impetus to the movement [or its suppression; disfm-ored
• groups can define themselves, and be defined, through regulated speech. Sre JAMES
GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCO'ITSBORO 27-29, 74-84, 204 (1994) (African Americans); Da\id
Suchoff, Tlze Rosenberg Cose alld the New Hllx Illtellectuals, ill SECRET AGENTS: TilE ROSENBERG CAsE, McCARTHYISM, AND FIFTIES AMERICA (M;ujorie Garber &: Rebecca 1.. Walko,~itz eds., 1995) 153, 158-59, 161 Uews). Moreo\'er, I see no strong reason why the First
Amendment should limit its protection to cases in which the suppression of a definable
group's speech is intentional.
138 See generally OWEN FISS, LIBERAUSM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND TilE MAN\"
USES OF STATE POWER (1996); FREEING THE FIRST &IENDMENT: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 195-223 (Da\id S. Allcn &: RobcrtJcnsen cds., 1995); C.-\TIIARINE
A. ?>.L\CKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); MARI J. MATSUDA ET At-, WORDS TIIAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, AsSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND TIlE FIRST AMENDMENT 77-78 (1993);
THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEEcn (1..·mraJ. Lederer &: Richard Delgado eds., 1995); CAss SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND TIlE PROBLEM OF FREE SI'E£ClI (1993);
Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedolll oj Expression in tlte Wornplau alld th~ Probltlll oj Discrimillatory
Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REv. 687, 694-95, 735 (1997); Owen M. Fiss, Frtt Spr«ll allli Social
Strudure, 71 IOWA 1.. REv. 1405 (1986); Owen M. FISS, n7l)' tlt~State1, 100 lIAR\'. 1.. RE\'. 781
(1987); Sangree, supra note 101, at 559-60 (arguing tllal sc.xual harassment law furthers
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dermine and devalue the speech of minority groups, because racist
speech silences minorities and makes their speech seem less credible
when it does appear.1 39 Unlimited campaign spending arguably dis~
torts democratic dialogue by allowing wealthy donors and interest
groups to set the public agenda, while politica] deliberation gets lost
in the scramble for cash. Cable providers may exclude broadcasters
from their former audiences by refusing to carry them as pmt of a
cable package.
The analogy can be seen by describing copyright's incentive
mechanisms in greater detail. Copying makes original authors less
attractive to publishers because there is not much point in paying for
what others will then take for free. Audiences will pay less attention to
the original speaker if her work can be freely reproduced by others,
perhaps even without attribution. 140 Ultimately, copying makes
authors less willing to enter into the market in lhe first place. The ar~
gument for cop}'light explains how piratical speech can have negative
effects on authors and audiences' access to spe<::ch, just as the radical
case for speech regulation explains how hate speech can distort the
speech incentives of minority-group members and the receptivity of
potential audiences or how political donations can crowd certain
views out of the public domain. Therefore, copyright and the radical
theories have a family resemblance in that they identify certain
mechanisms that operate through speech and that negatively affect
the functioning of the marketplace for speech.
The similarity in the arguments for regulation is apparent, for
example, in Catharine MacKinnon's argument for a civil rights rem~
edy for pornography. Not only does MacKinnon argue that porno~
graphic speech silences women's speech, her analysis converges with •
that of infringement doctrine. Both in evaluation of substantial si11li~
larity and in application of the fair use defense. copyright refuses to
look at an accused work as a whole. This is because the cxitical issue is
the harm the defendant may have done to th(! plaintiff by using a
copyIighted work, no matter what else the defendant may have cre~
free speech values); Frederick Schauer, The Political IlIddellce of Jlle hee SPeech Plindple; (14 U.
COLO. L. REv. 935 (1993).
139 See, e.g., 'Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Lei Him Go: Regulating Racist Spe/'ch oil
Campus, 1990 DUKE LJ. 431, 458-61; Mari]. Matsuda, Public Respollse to Racist Slm'ch: Consideling the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2323-26 (1989).
140 Cf David L. Marcus, Faux Vimllegut Talk Sheds Light 011 P(lltJel' of 'Net, BOS'rON GLOu~,
Aug. 13, 1997, at D1 (discussing problems that occur whcn a creativc work is widdy
misatlributed).
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ated in the course of so doing. MacKinnon likewise rejects the "w'ork
as a whole" standard of obscenity law: "[T]aking the work 'as a whole'
ignores [the fact that] legitimate settings diminish the inj11l1' perceived to be done to those whose trivialization and objectification it
contextualizes.... If a woman is subjected, why should it matter that
the work has other value?"141 This agreement on what is essentially a
detail of the respective regulatory schemes shows how both kinds of
market-failure theories attend to what a regulable work does in the
world and not to what it says in itself.142
The incentive-based or speech-on-both-sides argument also appears where relatively new media are at issue and, lacking a tradition,
their structure and function are contestable.14S Government has to do
something about new media, and the Supreme Court has recognized
that government action will inevitably balance speech against speech
in such cases. The Court has accepted the theory that the Federal
Communications Commission was established because an unregulated radio spectrum led to chaos. So many people were trying to talk
that they cancelled each other out. l44 'While other forms of regulation,
including a property regime based on first-in-time capture of spectrum, would also have worked, possibly better, some form of government-backed rights holding 'was necessary to enable broadcast
speech. l45 Although broadcasters were private entities, their actions
threatened to "snuff out the free speech of others." The Court ultimately found that there was no right to do so, and that there was a

HI Catharine A MacKinnon, POTllography, Civil Rights, alld SjJt'«II, 20 HAm'. c.R.-c.L. L.
REv. 1, 21 (1985); see also CATHARINE A MACKINNON, TOWARD A FDIINISTTUEORY OF TIlE
STATE 202 (1989).
142 Self-help arguments also align against cop}right and hate speech/pornography
regulation. See supra notes 27-40 and accompaIl}ing tc.xl.
143 See Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 1, at 408 (1"0 the c.xtent that the cop}right
is perceiyed as an economic de\ice to advance the public interest in dissemination of intellectual products it is comparable to a broadcast license. Both arc monopolies granted by
the government to facilitate the distribution of information. Both bear the same public
interest burden."); see also Columbia Broad. S}'s. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.s. 9-1
(1973); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
144 See Red Lion, 395 U.S at 376 ("Without go\,crnmcnt control, the medium would be
oflittIe use because of tIle cacaphon)' of competing \·oices. none of which could be clearly
and predictably heard.").
145 SeeThomas ,,,,T. Hazlett, Physiml Smrci~l~ Relit &tkillg, alld th~ Fint J\III~I/lllllnlt, 9; CoLUM. L. REv. 905 (1997) [hereinafter Hazlett, Physical Scam{l']; Thomas W. Hazlett, Th~
Rationalil)' of U.S. Regulation of the Bl'Oadmsl SPrctTlllII, 33 J. L. & ECON. 133 (1990) l hereinafter Hazlett, Rationality].
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strong government interest in preventing such silencing. H6 In addi~
tion, the Court has found that there is a First Amendment interest ill
encouraging the dissemination of a diversity of views via broadcast
media. 147
More recently, the Supreme Court upheld must-cany rules l'e~
quiring cable providers to carry local broadcast stations in ordel' to
preserve the profitability of broadcast so tlIat free local television will
remain widely available.148 Cable providers are required to subsidize
broadcast television for the greater public good, just as fair use argua~
bly requires some authors to subsidize others for the greater good. 1,J!)
The Court found the costs of must-carry rules to cable providers
could be justified in large part because of con<:erns that cable could

146 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387. In Associated Press v. United States, the Suprcmc Court tipheld antitrust controls on newspapers on similar grounds: MFrecdom of the prcss from
governmental interference under the First Amendmcnt docs not sanction rC)I'ession of
that freedom by private interests." 326 U.S. 1,20 (1945) (footnotc omitted), Bccause the
First Amendment is based on the belief that a diversity of available vicws is essential to II
free socicty, its "command that the govcrnmcnt itself shall 110t impcde the fl'ec flow of
ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose I'cslmints
upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom." Id.
147 See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Conlin., 436 U.S. 775(1978); see all'o Time Wal'llc1'l~l1tlll't
Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 976 (D.C. Cil: 1996) (holding that public acccss to a divcrslt)' of
views and sources of opinion is an interest Mat the core ofthc First Amcndmcnt").
148 See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
149 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Ellioll, /111:.,
521 U.S. 457 (1997), sheds some light on the question of when a group can bc ta)(cd to
support others' speech. Glickman upheld indusu'y-specific tlL'WS to support generic IIdvel'tising for that industry'S products. Although people often have a right not to be compclled
to pay for others' speech, the Court held that the government c:ould assess fees for product
advertising. SeeAbood v. Deu'oit Bd. ofEduc., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The Court rcachcd this
conclusion becausc, first, no producer had to change or restrain its own advcrtising. cven
though the regulation decreased the money available to pay for such ads. Copyrighililllits,
too, never resu-ain authors, even if some authors make less moncy because of them. Second, the regulations did not compel speech from anyone; no producer Was requircd to
associate itself with the generic ads. A copyright mmer is not compcllcd to rcpcat 01' elldorse a fair use out of his 01' her mm mouth. Cj. Pruneyard Shopping CI1~ v. Robins, tJ41i
U.S. 74, 88 (1980). Third, there was no compulsion to cndorse or financc any political 01'
ideological views. In copyright, fair lIsers might well advocatc for some ideological vil.'wpoint, but the governmcnt would not have chosen any such mcssage, and in that sense the
burden is less than that imposed by a government decision to make a plum producer pay
for ads that say that all plums are tasty. Inasmuch as f.'lir use is decentr:llized, it is 1I0t a~
worrisome as taxes on magazines or papel: And, like a progrcssive income tax, it llIay
weigh most heavily on the Mrichcst" works. Glickman's underlying point was that compulsory ta.'{es for advertising were justified, evcn though some peoplc objccted, because the
contributions increased the welfare of the producers as a whole,just as limits 011 copyright
increase the welfare of authors as a whole by allowing them to dmw on sources of inspit'ation and information.
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take anticompetitive action against broadcast competitors, squeezing
broadcasters out of the market.
That anticompetitive possibilit}~ howevel~ relies on the behavior
of the television audience. Even if cable did not can)' broadcast
channels, television households could get the benefit of both if they
used manual switches. But the average viewer is unwilling to use a
switch. Because the television audience is composed of teclmologically inept couch potatoes, cable providers could exclude broadcasters from cable households. The Court characterized this interaction
between cable providers and the market they face as a matter of providers' power: "A cable operator, unlike speakers in other media, can
thus silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the
switch. The potential for abuse of this private power over a ccnu-al
avenue of communication cannot be overlooked. "150 Crucially, the
power to silence depends not on any technological facts but on belzavioral facts; not on characteristics of the speaker but of the audience. lSI
Insofar as they look to the appropriate conditions for the mmdmization of speech given the ",ray that people actually behave, the mustcarry rules have the same justifications as copyright, campaign
finance reform, and regulation of hate speech and pornography.
Others have noted that copyright is relevant to more politicized
free speech issues. Eugene Volokh and like-minded scholars, who
think that the radical theories are a very bad idea, have also become
nervous about copyright.I52 Meanwhile, some of the radical thcorists
are arguing that courts' unhesitating acceptance of copyright, a
speech restriction that serves the interests of the wealthy and power150

Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 656.

See Yochai Benkler, Free as tlle Air to Common Usr: First Jilllflldlllflli Cot/strait/ts ot/ En·
clomre of tlle Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 374 (1999) (noting that barriers to llIul·
151

tiple cable operators competing for cadt \icwer are not really physical or technologirnl but
economic).
152 See gt!llerall)' Volokll & Lemley, supra notc 124; Yoloklt & McDonnell. supra note 57.
See also E.'i:pert Report of Professor I..a\\TCnCC Lessig, A & M Records. Inc. \', Napster. Inc••
114 F. SUppa 2d. 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (Nos. 99-5183. 00-0074), availablr al http://dl,napster.com/lessig.pdf (Iast\isited Oct. 31, 2000) (discussing intersection betwccn free speech
and coppight in the Napstcr Music file-shating litigation); Brief of Amici Curiae J\ssocia·
tion of Am. Physicians & Surgcons, Inc. et al., A & M Records. Inc. \'. Napster, ]nc., 2000
U.S. App. LEXiS 18688 Qui}' 28, 2000) (Nos, 00-164.01, 00-16-t03), avai/ablt at http://
dl.napster.com/amicus_physicians.pdf (last \isited Oct. 31, 2000) (anti·;,bortion grOllp
opposing injunction against cop}nght infringement on the grounds that such injunctions
could be used against other kinds of speech); Brief of American Chil Liberties Union et
aI., A & M Records, Inc. Y. Napster, Inc., 2000 U,S. App. LEXIS 18688 Uul}. 28. 2000) (Nos.
00-16401, 00-16403), available at http://www.adunc.org/cyber/ napstcJ·-brief.hunl (last
\isited Oct. 31, 2000) (opposing copyright injunction 011 frec speech grounds).
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ful, is unprincipled and hypocritical when the radical theories of
regulation are brushed aside as incompatible with free speech.tlill
What the people on both sides of the issue-particularly the radical
theorists-have not yet discussed, however, is that copyright is llotjust
a run-of:.the-mill speech restriction. It is a member of a family of
speech restrictions unified by the claim that some government regulations improve the functioning of the market for speech by acting as
the equivalent of a police force keeping order. I 5<l Copyright is the pel'feet demonstration of Stanley Ingber's point that marketplace theories readily lend themselves to arguments for government intervention. Once we decide that a market is valuable because it furthers
individual choice, it becomes possible to argue that individuals should
be regulated in aspects of their market behavior to increase the aggregate amount of choice. I55
The fact that incentives to speak have constitutional weight and
deserve First Amendment consideration is important. Ifwe accept the
speech-enhancing justification for copyright, we cannot easily dismiss
other market-failure claims. If copyright serves dIe First Amendment,
we cannot say, as the Supreme Court has, that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment. "156
a. The Importance ofIncentives for Future Speech
One response to my claim of sU'uctural similarity between copyright and other market-failure theories is that copyright is 110t about
153 See, e.g., Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Tell ArglllllmlS Agai1lst lIalc-Spredi Rt'gll/alioll: How lfllid'!, 23 N. Ky. L. REv. 475, 484 (1996); Richard Delgado &: David H. \\111, PmslIre Valves alld Bloodied Chicke1ls: An Allalysis of Palemalistic Objectiolls 10 lIaie Sptwh Rt'gll/alioll, 82 CAL. L. REv. 871, 892 (1994); Martin E. Lee, The Pliee Hi' Pay: The Case Agaillst
Racist Speech, Hale Propagallda and Pomography, NAT'L CAnl. REI'., Oct. 4, 1996, at 17 (book
review).
15-1 The incentive-based argument is not limited to left-leaning acadcmics cvcn outsldc
the copyright field. For example, Justice 'White, dissenting in Gerlz. v. Robert lIHch, IIIC., 418
U.S. 323 (1974), argued that private indhiduals should not faC(' high b<lrricrs to libel suits:
"It is not at all inconceivable that virtlmlly unrestrnined dcfamnlory rcmarks abollt primtc
citizens will discournge them from speaking out and concerning thcmselvcs with social
problems." Id. at 400 (White,]., dissenting). See also Richard A. Epstein. Pllblicatioll, (/1/(111/11
First Amendment: The Dangers ofFirst Amendmellt Exeepliona/isll/, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1003, 1033
(2000) (arguing that enjoining defamatory broadcasts would ultim<ltely strengthen till'
press's information-gathering ability by increasing its credibility).
155 See Ingbe1~ supra note 23, at 4-5.
156 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
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restricting A's speech to enhance the relative voice of B. e\'en if it is
about restricting A's speech to B's advantage. Because this charactedzation does not note that the advantage that copyright confers on B is
based on the attractiveness of B's speech-people who want it will
have to pay-this reformulation makes copydght sound even worse
from a free speech perspective, like an aggressive libel law or resUictions on seditious speech or bans on comparative price ad\'ertising for
alcohol, all of which benefit one group at another's eh'Pense. :More
importantly, the "advantage and not speech" characterization does
not descdbe the reasoning tllat cow·ts and tlleorists actually use to
defend copyright, and it is tllis reasoning tllat is structurally similar to
other, less favored arguments. Copyright is justified .because of its systematic effects on future speakers--tlle profits tlmt copydght makes
possible will spur many people to invest in creating speech.
Once we concede that harm to market-based incentives to speak
in tlle future is harm to First Amendment-protected interests, however, it makes little sense to limit tlle cogniz.'lble class of speechsuppressing private acts to that which merely copies and sllcks off
profits. It is not the profit-making or even tlle profit-stealing nature of
the infringement fuat is constitutionally relevant. It is tlle decrease in
tlle speaker's incentive to speak, which could also be caused by speech
fuat derided her or by speech so pervasive tlmt her message was lost,
tllat triggers First Amendment interests on her side.157 Put another
way, it is descriptively false to say tllat First Amendment law is not concerned 'wifu silencing (defined as pdvate parties' acts tlmt decrease
other private parties' incentives to speak) or crowding out (defined as
private parties' speech tllat makes otller private parties' speech less
likely to be attended to).
lATe regulate when we tllink tllat incentives to speak deserve protection. Thus, we regulate copiers, but not people who tell other peo-

15i

Frank Michelman points out tlmt "silencing" is usually as figurath'c as it is literal:

American constitutional law has long indulgcd in C\'cn morc extended
figurations of silencing, reaching back at least to the moment when it was resolved that punishment of speech already uttered, as well as prior restraint of
yet·unuttered speech, can count as an abridgment of the freedom of speech
and a cognate deprivation of liberty forbidden by the first and fourteenth
amendments, The silencing "Tought by criminaliz.'llion of speech acts is less
direct, more metaphorical, and no more reliabl}' efficacious than that
'\Tought (on Professor MacKinnon's account) by pornography.
Frank I. Michelman, Collceptions o/Democrac), ill Jillle/icall ColIslitllliolloi.tbglllllml: 77/t Case oj
Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291, 296 n.13 (1989) (citations omitted).
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pIe that they should not scream at their children. Though both decrease others' incentives to speak, only one group does so in a way we
recognize as unjustified. Alternatively, if really good government decreased the public's incentive to speak out on public affairs, because
there was no reason to complain, we would not worry about First
Amendment problems. The distinction between acceptable silencing
and unacceptable, thus regulable, silencing is necessary and valid.
Since we can never escape choices about whose speech to favor, we
should focus on why we choose one group over another.
The free speech justification for copyright may also seeIil distinct
from other market failure arguments because it sounds in economics;
it is about cold-blooded economic calculation, not artistry and the joy
of creation. I5S By contrast, the explanations for why pornography,
hate speech, or well-funded political campaigns can suppress others'
speech seem psychological and mushy. Economic rationality works
through psychological structures, of course, as any human motivation
does, but we are not accustomed to thinking of it that way. It seems
easier to say that people who feel threatened and oppressed by others'
speech should just grit their teeth and fight back with better ideas
than to say that people who are upset by others' copying should take
pride in the joy of creation itself and should be glad that their expression reaches so many people. Nevertheless, the other market-failure
theories can equally be described as problems of economic incentives,
just as authorship and creativity can readily be described in romantic
ways that ignore the influence of economic incentives.
The same is true on the audience's end. Jack Balkin has recently
argued that all speech competes with other speech in an important
way-audience time is limited, and someone who is watching The XFiles is not debating foreign policy at the local Republican Party headquarters. 159 The real scarcity that is relevant to First Amendment
analysis is of people's time and attention, not of opportunities to
speak in any particular medium. Competition exists in 11 oneconomic-or at least nonmonetized-registers as well.I 6o
158 Standard copyright rhetoric merges the author and the cntrcprcncul', I'ccognizlng
that the author who has an interest in making moncy will ('ontmct with pcoplc who can
distribute her works. See Patterson, supra note 14, at 53-54. Evcn whcn wc conceivc of crcativity as psychologically motivated, we expect that the impulse to gct widc rccognition 1'01'
that creativity will be economic; why else would a creator sclI hcr rights to a publishCI'?
159 See Balkin, supra note 113, at 409.
160 A related point is that speech is therefore, like othcr apparcntly unlimitcd "public"
goods, vulnerable to slow erosion. Some theorists argue that using an idca ncvcI' "dcplctcs"
it in the manner of a physical resource. See Mark A. Lemley, Th,~ Economics of /mprovl'meJIl ill

HeinOnline -- 42 B.C. L. Rev. 46 2000-2001

December 2000]

Cop)'right as a Model for Fffl! SPtl!dl Law

47

Once we accept that speech trades off with speech, it is simply a
matter of calculation to determine how much exposure to pornogt"aphy decreases a woman's incentive to participate in public life, or how
much spending by the major political parties decreases a new party's
ability to reach potential converts.I61 Then, if those disincentives are
unjustified, we n~ed to figure out how to counteract them. Maybe
sometimes regulation would be more justified than in particular cases
of copying for fun and profit.
b. COp)'light's Effects on Content

Because the other market-failure theories are often rejected on
the grounds that they impermissibly regulate the content of speech, it
is useful to look in greater detail at copyright's effects on content. In a
world without copyright, information would be distributed differently.
There would probably be patrons of the arts, bOtll governmental and
private, and the content of that art would be shaped by patrons' preferences. Without copyright, coordination difficulties and free riding
problems would make it difficult for the less wealtlly to aggt'egatc
their resources and fund creativity; tlms, as Neil Netanel argues,
wealth and power would likely have more influence on tlle kinds of
expression that would be readily distributed. 162 COllversely, copyright
encourages creators (and investors) toward works tlmt may prove
popular with some market segment. The desire to give a mass audience what it will pay for, while not dispositive of content, makes a
significant difference in many creative decisions.1 63 Cop}'light encourIntellectualPropert), Law, 75 TEX. L REv. 989,1045 (1997); Mc;John, slIpra note 119. nt 10607. But overexposure can drain an idea, or 01 kind of expression derh'ec:l from that ide:t, of
vitality; consider Seillfeld and the Spice Girls. Whether coppight protects ngninst such
overexposure or encourages it is nnother question entirely.
161 CJ. RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 284-90 (1992) (pro\iding equation to determine whether abortion should be banned). I do not me:tn that these rnlculations \,ill
be easy or exact, just that factfinders (such as Congress) could gnther relC\-allt C\idellce
and judge its credibility:
162 See Netanel, supra note 63, at 288.
163 See Benkler, supra note 151, nt 400-08. Benkler nrgues that e:tch increment of copyright protection encourages further centralization. which harms t!emocrncy nnt! dh·ersity. 1
understand him to be arguing about the ncgath'e effects of marginnl increases in copyright, not copyright in general. See id. nt 394 n.180, 401. I agree that 01 thin copyright focused on preserving incentives to create by protecting agninst wholesale, 1I0ntrnnsfonnn!h'e copying would be best for speech. Especially as Bcnkler's c.xplanation of why incrensed
rights increase centralization relies hea\ily on large orgnniz.,tiolls' nbilit)' to crente derh-a!h'e (transformati\'e) works from their stockpiles. I doubt his mtalysis would produce \\idel)'
di\'ergent results from mine.
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ages the creation and dissemination of the speech of those who seek
economic rewards, decreasing the relative voices of those who create
for personal satisfaction, for the glory of God, or for the respect and
praise of the audience.
Perhaps the model of television and radio programming would
exist in some modified form in the absence of copyxight, so that interesting stories would be available for free, their content pervaded
with ads so that the average consumer would sit through the ads to get
the story. In that case, we might expect that creators whose work does
not fit well next to an ad for Burger King fries would have a harder
time reaching an audience; as evidence for this proposition, consider
that the markets for books and even film are much more varied than
the television and radio markets.
Authorial self-help as descxibed in Section I.C above would likely
be popular, and media that would be easiest to copy-protect would
receive the most investment-computer disks that could be read Ollce
and would then erase themselves, for example, instead of traditional
books. Self-help would have effects on content as well as form. CopyI suspect, however, that Benkler romanticizes the possibility ofa Icss-copyrightcd
world. He argues that concentrated media systems are likely 10 exclude challcngcs to the
prevailing wisdom and translate unequal economic power into uncqual pOWCI' to set the
terms of public debate. See id. at 377-78. But how would small, divcrse sources obtnin a
wide audience without the possibility of large-corporation allianccs for distribution, as his
exemplar Matt Drudge (briefly) did? Cf David Segal, Big Record Labels Slart 10 Like Ihe SOil/III
of Ollline klusic, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2000, at HI (discussing large labels' distl'ibutional
and content-sorting advantages). Also, because Benkler focuses on the individual as the
source of meaning, he appears to discount the value of common culture-in Imlay's cconomic language, the "network effects" of having The Wizard ofOz as a commOnl'efCl'cllt.
Finally, Benkler does not fully defend the argument that conccntl11ted mcdia giants decrease diversity. Even Disney produces arguably blasphemous movics tl11'ollgh nn
affiliate. Some economic theory suggests that large corpOl11tiOIlS will supply some contcnt
that appeals to specialized tastes as well as to the median taste in order 10 caplUl'e ns much
of the market as possible; if a provider can offer only one TV channel, it lllay well pl'ogmlll
for the median taste, but if it has three it may try to appcal to thc top thrce grollps. &'~,
e.g., Daniel L. Brenner, OWllership ami COlltellt Regulatioll ill Alergillg ami Emergillg fIJI'dill. ,J&
DEPAUL L. REv. 1009 (1996); Benjamin M. COlllpaine. The Imjlact of Owtlership QII COlltellt:
Does it Matter?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 755 (1995). Indced, in my view, the risk that
combining conglomerate power with the modern ability to target subscts of lilt audience
will lead to too much fragmentation is at least as great as the risk ofviewpoillt hOlllogcnitn.
tion. Every reader can now receive a personalized newspaper wiling her only nbout things
she already knows she cares about. The risk in this scenario is thnt we will lose :Illy common culture. See Todd Gitlin, PI/blic Spheres or Public Sphericl/les?, ill M~DIA. RITUAL AND
IDENTITY 168 (Tamar Liebes & James Curran eds., 1998); Elihu I(:ttz, AlId Delil/('1' Us /tom
Segmelltation, ill BREAKING UP AMERICA: ADVERTISERS AND TilE NEW MEDIA WORLD (ROg('I'
G. Noll & Monroe Joseph Turow eds" 1997). I believe that copyright and its limits can help
us navigate a path between Scylla and Charybdis.
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right encourages investment in entertainment oyer facts, as facts are
not copyrightable. If authors had to use other means to protect their
work, they would presumably be equally able to protect facts and
fictions, and therefore there would not be a copyright-ulduced skew
toward the fanciful.
The bias of copyright, pushing new work away from what has
gone before it, also has systematic effects on content and viewpoint. 1G4.
Copyright favors expression that looks like a creative genius'; the further an author gets from what has gone before, the more protection
he will get. I6S It does not recognize value in folklore or othel' u-aditional art forms whose richness consists in repetition of u-aditional
themes.l 66 Copyright favors high and mass culture over counterculture and subculture, since marginal groups are more likely to express
themselves by unauthorized reliance on popular and well-known materials, while large corporations that have a "library" of proven chm-acters will retise winning formulas. I67 Copiers who borrow without per1&1 Cj FCC Y. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 776-77 (1978) (Brennan,J., dissenting)
(discussing how certain groups are proportionally more likely to express themsch'cs using
the seven dirty words, so suppression of broadcasts using thosc words "ill bc systematically
biased against those groups and thc \iewpoints those groups arc proportionally more likely
to hold). '
165 Thus, facts get very little copyright protection no matter how hard it was to unearth
tllem or express them, while fiction is hea\ily f",'ored by comparison. Even \\ithin fiction, a
hierarchy of creamity prevails. A hackneyed plot \\ith stock characters gets a thin copyright, see Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Ch~ 1936) (Hand,].). while
innO\<ltive, whimsical puppets Ihing on tllcir own strangc island getllluch stronger protection, see Sid & Marty Krofft TelC\ision Prods., Inc. Y. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir. 1977). This allocation of rights fa\'ors tlle iconoclast, thc author of lrifillileJrst over the
author of a Harlequin Romance. Harlequin and otller romance publishers ha\'c style
guidelines tllat indicate exactly what sort of plots are acceptable, whatt}l)e ofjobs thc hero
and heroine should have, what kind of prcmarital sc.xual acti\it)' is permissible, when first
sexual contact should occur, and how many words thc nO\'el should contain. Sre CAROL
THURSTON, THE ROMANCE REVOLUTION: EROTIC NO\'ELS FOR WOMEN AND TilE QUEST FOR
A NEW SEXUAL IDENTITY 223-26 (1987). E"cn one that met conventional standards of
"good writing" would have trouble pro\ing that anytlling other than vcrbatim cop}ing
constituted an infringement. Copyright also f.'wors tlle kinds of creati\it)' men havc histori·
cally dominated over the kinds of creati\ily womcn ha\'c historically dominated, sincc
women's art has often been variations on a thcmc, like quilting. instead of distinct creations. See Shelley 'Wright, A Feminist Explomtioll of the Ltgal Protertioll of~\rt, 7 CAN.J. WOMEN
& L. 59, 90-94 (1994).
166 See, e.g" Christine Haight Farley, Protedillg Folklore of IlldigtllOIlS Ptoplrs: Is II/ttllerillot
Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. RE\'. 1 (1997).1 do not cndorse Farley's notion that copyright's boundaries should be expanded and its term extended in perpetuity to protect
folklore, but she cogently sets fortIl tlle \\<l}'S in whicll cop}right's definitions c.xclude what
many people consider tlle IllOst valuable aspects of traditional culturc.
167 See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1975);JENKINS. Sllpm note 48; Coombe, Objects ofPropertJ~ slIpra notc 82; Nels Jacobson, Notc, Faith, Hope &
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mission and then add their own content tend to be making fun, making light, attacking the conventional; they do not have a "stable" of
well-recognized character and situations. 16S Such copiers do not set
the agenda of public discussion. They generally lack name recognition on their own-to get people to pay attention, they may need to
trade on names and situations we already knoW. 169 The owners of
popular products, by contrast, have an incentive to keep their most
popular products from close association with anything unpopular 01'
unsettling.
Despite these predictable effects, copyright can be defended as
content-neutral in aim. It could be that punishing copying that destroys the economic incentive to speak by substituting for a creator's
speech and satisfying demand is like prohibiting the interruption of a
public speaker. John Hart Ely persuasively argues that prohibiting interruption, even by "the most coherent and trenchant p~litical com~
mentary," would be perfectly constitutional because the underlying
value protected by the regulation would be the right of the original
speaker to speak and tlle audience to listen, and those rights are not
dependent on the message of the interrupter or even on the fact that
the interrupter has a message. Interruption that agrees ordisagl'ees
with the speaker threatens the values sought to be protected.l 7o Likewise, pure copying, whatever the underlying intent, harms speech and
thus can be prohibited. Yet, as Part I explained, many copyright cases
do not involve pure copying. Also, questions remain regarding
whether certain speakers are more likely to benefit from an anti·
interruption/ copying regulation and whether the regulation will pI'event the interrupter/copier from speaking at all.
Parody: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, "011, Pretty Woman, " and Paroe/isls' Rights, 31 I-lous. L. Ih:v.
955,1015-18 (1994). Rosemary Coombe notes that copyright piracy is oftcn carricd Ollt by
immigrants struggling to survive and others at the margin of Amcrican socicty. Sce Rose-mary J. Coombe, The ClIllllral Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches 10 Law ami Socie(y ill
Conditions oJGlobalization, 10 AM. U. INT'L L. & POL'y 791, 817-18 (1995).
168 See Mark Gunderson, Copyright .•• For Poorer or Richer, al http://www.icollllu.ca/
macos/copyrite.txt (last visited Jan. 15, 1999); VirComlll, Copyrighl Law Is Wrollg, (II
hup://www.cyborganic.com/people/vircomm/projccts/antkopy (last visitcd Jan. 15,
1999). This could be desclibed as a problem of risk aversion-copyright oW/lcrs do /lot
want to risk the value of their property, and thus they are less likely to nmkc rcally cl't':lIlvc
or controversial use of their works than copiers arc. See MeJohn, supra notc 116, at 106.
169 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Rogers v. Koons,
960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (onc of several cases involving "appropriation :lI'Iist"Jcff Koolls
who copies elements of popular works as sardonic comJllelltarr 011 thcm); Air l'irall's, 581
F.2d 75l.
170 John Hart Ely, Flag Desecratioll: A Case Study ill the Roles of CategO/izalioll allli BiI/wlril/g
in First AllIendll/e1lt Analysis, 88 HAR\,. L. REv. 1482, 1499 (1975).
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Frederick Schauer argues that mechanisms that repress speech
are all-pervasive, in norms about polite or appropriate speech, ill conventions that limit what will be understood as intelligible communication, and in other varied pressures that lead people to watch their
words. In this view, censorship, in the sense of external forces beming
on individual communication, is everywhere; the question is what
kinds the government should regulate when it pm·ticipates, as it must,
in shaping those forces. l7l Meanwhile, "\Tendy Gordon m·gues for
broad rights to use pre-existing creative works on the ground that
some works essentially reach out and grab audiences. A person who
has been powerfully affected by a work may feel a sense of constraint,
a need to respond to the thoughts and feelings generated by e.xposure
to the initial work. 172
Schauer and Gordon are describing two aspects of the smne phenomenon, as prior works are part of the environment that shapes
what stories we want to tell and even what we cml imagine telling.
Copyright generates works that affect what will be created thereafter,
not just by prohibiting pure copying and by directly encouraging
variation, but also by altering the background universe of information
that provides the raw material for tlle next generation, in tlle literal
sense of the word. Government tllUS participates in encouraging some
kinds of content and discouraging others.
2. Differences Between Market-Failure-Based Regulations:
Infringement Contrasted to Hate Speech mld Pornography
Copyright is a regime tllat affects a lm·ge amount of speech, but
seems relatively content-neutral, and in evaluating it we have to ask
exactly how stringently tlle First Amendment requires us to evaluate
content-neutral speech regulations. Perhaps smprisingly, tlle breadtll
of copyright's effects becomes a factor in its favOl; while tlle more targeted radical theories seem more suspect. The following subsections
explore the family of speech-versus-speech claims by contrasting copyright to tlle regulation of hate speech and pornography.
a. Borrowing Ve1:5US Attaddng

What is really at stake in tlle evaluation of speech-versus-speech
claims is a judgment about what options people should bave to reIiI SeeSchauer, OlltOWg)~ slIpm note 94.
m See Gordon, A Property Right ill &lJ·E:o:prossioll. slIpm note 116.
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. pined to speech that in some way harms them. As Kent Greenawalt
has noted, the democratic aim of promoting courageous citizens, "independent of mind and hardy emotionally," does not mean that all
kinds of hardiness are equally desirable goals for First Amendment
jurisprudenceP3 Greenawalt argues that fortitude ill the face of serious and imminent threats of violence is not the kind of hardiness that
is valuable for democratic citizenship; thus, penalizing such thl'eats
does not conflict with the goal of creating robust and vigorous citizencommunicators.174 Similarly, willingness to create in the absence of
the economic incentives generated by copyright is not the kind of
hardiness that we should require of speakers. The question is what
other kinds of hardiness government should or should not demand of
its citizens.
One obvious distinction between copyright and the regulation of
racist and pornographic speech is that the mechanisms by which "silencing" works in the two cases are different. Richard Delgado recently described the speech-versus-speech justification for regulating
hate speech: "[h]ate messages also make the task of the minority
speaker harder, because of the toll that they take on the credibility of
speakers of color.... The very same message from a woman will regis tel'
differently from one delivered by a man."175 He concludes that
[b]ecause the message is the same, irrespective of the
speaker, the reason for the different reception cannot lie in
the words themselves ... [T]he only possible origin of this
different credibility lies in the system of stories and messages
that we choose to tell about, and to, minorities and
women-in short, hate speech. 176
The speech of A, then, deprives B of effective speech, the one value
that a First Amendment absolutist cannot denyP7
The economic motivations to buy or use au infdnger's product
can be unrelated to the literal message of the infringed material,
173 KENT
1U

GREENAWAL'f, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF L\NGUAGE 292 (1989).

Seeid.

175 Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of Ihe First AII/elllimelll, llll HAIlV. L.
REv. 778, 792-93 (2000) (reviewing Steven H. Shiffrill, DISSENT, INJUSTICg, AND 'fm:
MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999» (emphasis added).
176 [d.
177 See id. Copying and hate speech are not differentjttst because a minority speaker's
incentives and attractiveness are affected by speech distant in time and place. Copyright.
too, assumes that the regime governing speech in general will affect future installces of
speech.
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while the connection between the cognitive biases invoked by racist/sexist speech and the oppressive messages of that speech is strong.
In other words, racist speech may destroy a minodt.}' speaker's credibility or otherwise short-circuit cognitive mechanisms for evaluating
speech, but the persuasive mechanism by which such suppression
works is itself arguably deserving of protection. Infdngement., on the
other hand, makes a copyright owner's speech economically unatu-active: Why buy a newspaper when you can get the stories for free? The
copier is not the enemy of the creator's viewpoint, only of his or her
livelihood.l78 The infringer is piggybacking on the first speaker, while
other speakers are using their targets in an entirely different waygdnding them down. Where piggybacking is not primmil}'
antagonistic to the first speakel; despite its negative effects on
incentives, racist and pornographic speech is. Certainly, regulations of
hate speech and pornography can be defended on the ground that
such speech inflicts harm on the people it targets, but that rationale
stands in contrast to copyright's encouragement of disagreement.
In fact, the fair use doctrine's preference for pm'ody mId o'iticism
parallels the argument against regulating hate speech, The m'gulllent
is as follows: There are some hanns to incenti\'es to speak that. the
government cannot take into account when considedng whether or
not to regulate. In copyright, those hm'ms m'e (at least) hm'lUs to incentives that may occur when vicious reviews or parodies suppress
demand for a work, This is either because the interpreL'\tion of the
parodist/reviewer is more importrult to ft'ee e.xpression thmi the diminished incentive to create new works that might be savaged, or because the effect on incentives comes not through pure economic substitution but through some other mechanism, I would m'gue that the
former proposition is bound up with the latter.
Valuing cdticism over "odginal" creation raises the specter of
content bias, Yet it can be defended as a way to keep people beJie\ing
in the marketplace of ideas, since a good review is probably more
credible in a world that allows bad reviews. This is a concern for
proper marketplace functioning, a regulatory concern. It also pm-al178 As discussed in Section LB, this distinction between coppighl and the radicaltheories does not track. the actualla\\' of copyright, which often imposes liability on a copier
whose \iC\\point is clearly distinct from that of the copyright O\\1lcr or who participates in
a different market, for example by parod}ing the cop}nghted matcrial. NC\'crthcless, the
distinction between types of speech incentives and disincenth'es can be defended if we
distinguish economic harms from dignitary harms and defend cop}Tighl only as a rt'sponse to the former,
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leIs the traditional truth-finding rationale for free speech; criticism,
even false or erroneous criticism, is valuable because it tests the value
of prior works and received wisdom. Furthermore, if criticism is allowed but pure substitution is not, there are still large incentives to
create. Therefore, it is reasonable to value criticism or parody ovel' an
attacked work when the two come into conflict.
Perhaps racist speech and pornography are so much like criticism and parody that, even if they affect incentives to speak, they still
should not be regulated. Nonetheless, the analogy between the two
speech-conflict situations is still useful. In both cases we may recognize that an "unregulated" speech market is subject to skewing in favor of some speakers; there is no natural pregovernmental level of
unconstrained speech. Furthermore, infringement and racist speech
may operate by different noncognitive mechanisms, but the objection
in both cases is that the mechanisms are fundamentally ullfait~ Pmponents of hate speech regulation and the like believe that silencing
through the coercive power of racial epithets is wrong, just as copyright defenders believe that silencing through the limitation of economic incentives is wrong.
b. The Relationship Between Content Nelltrality and .J.\1ec/zanisllIs of Silencing
Copyright, unlike the radical theories, seems content- and viewpoint-neutral on its face. The decision to classifY a regulation as content-based or content-neutral, however, depends upon the categorization of the mechanism by which dangerous speech does harm. That
is, the neutrality argument is ultimately a characterization of the effects of the kinds of speech likely to be suppressed by regulation. To
see this point, take a standard example: the regulation of inciting
speech that creates a clear and present danger of violence. Unlike
regulation of racially derogatory fighting words, regulation of the entire category seems viewpoint-neutral. Anyone who advocates inlluinent violence in a way that is likely to succeed in triggering such violence will be punished; whether the violence is in support of
segregation or socialism, the advocacy is illegal. The proponent ofviolence could, however, characterize the regulation as viewpoint-based.
People who express the belief that violence is a good idea-at least
those who are likely to persuade others to agree-can be punished,
but those who express the opposite viewpoint, that nonviolence is the
appropriate way to effect change, will never be punished. As with a law
dividing pregnant persons from nonpregnant persons, it tUl'llS out
that only one side loses.
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One response to this criticism is that the advocacy of imminent
violence does what it does in a different way than the ad\'ocacy of
peaceful change, by destroying the audience's ability to reflect on
what it hears, which brings us back to the different-mechanisms argument. 179 The argument that speech that destroys a listener's ability
to abstain from violence is not persuasion but coercion is one plausible characterization, but there are others. In a real sense, if I say "Let's
take the damn street now" and my followers do so, I have been persuasive even if I have also been inarticulate. The persuasive power of
any argument often depends on an audience's preexisting biases and
favored concepts or code words, and deciding that some m'gument
operates outside the register of persuasion is tric1.1' business. I will not
attempt to resolve the issue; I use the example simply to demonstrate
that the determination that a regulation is content- or viewpointneutral will ultimately depend on judgments about how different
kinds of speech work.
.
Therefore, an infringer, particulm'ly one who takes only parts of a
copyrighted work, could well argue that infringement expresses the
viewpoint that copying is good and that there is nothing new under
the sun. 180 Popular anti-copyright rhetoric contains many such s~"\te
ments.181 No matter what the content of the infringed material, only
infringement can express this viewpoint in the most persuasive way,
because only infringement shows the audience what inftingemellt is
good for.
Copyright protects noninft'inging materials, never inft'inging materials; it embodies the viewpoint that inftingement is bad. This is only
neutral if infringement operates on the universe of available speech
in a way that differs from noninftingement, a way whose hm'Ills moe
more extensive than the harms of other kinds of speech. The harmful
incentive effects of infringement make it plausible to treat cop}Tight
179 Kent Greenawalt makes a similar move. Hc recognizes that prohibitions on encouraging political assassination and violent rcvolution f."wor peaceful ideologies ovcr ,;olclll
ones, but argues that "the preference for urging obediencc to law over urging ,;olencc is
not itself the kind of preference that is strongly at odds \\;th a principlc of frcc speech,"
C\"en if it may have unC\"en effects on differing ';C\\1>0ints. GREENAWALT, slIpra notc 173, at
122. To him, the ban on criminal advocacy (if cabincd to requirc an imminent likclihood
of harm) is an acceptable contentjudgmcnt, perhaps like other acceptable contcntjudgments that favor local telC\;sion stations over cablc pro\;dcrs or O"cators of cop}Tighlablc
works over infringers (also narrowly tailorcd).
180 CJ. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts \'. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 611 n.6 (1998) (Souler,j.,
dissenting) (discussing the "communicativc clement inherent in UlC VCr)' act of funding
[art] itself"),
181 See SIIpm note 55.
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as a neutral regulation, since copyright targets a mechanism of
speech-suppression and not a viewpoint as such. Note, howevel~ that
arguments for regulating hate speech, pornography, and campaign
finance similarly characterize their targets as behavior with effects 011
the market for speech. Under the radical theories, it is acceptable to
say that women are inferior or that the rich should pay no taxes, so
long as that speech does not use the (particularly powerful) mechanisms of sexually explicit subordination or saturation political adve!'tising. 182
The distinction between copyright and pornography or hate
speech regulation is therefore bottomed on an evidentiary disagl'eement. Both theories look at audience response to regulation or a lack
thereoE We are confident enough about how economic rationality
works that we can predict how unredressed infringement will affect
the production of speech. Without copyright, some people will create
because creation is independently satisfying, and some people will still
pay creators, whether as patrons of the arts or out of a sense of moml
obligation, but the addition of economic incentives has a significant
effect on the level of speech. By contrast, mechanisms of silencing
through racist speech and pornography are far less clear. Theories of
human psychology can explain the mechanisms, but they seem less
intuitively obvious to many people today than tlle idea that money
motivates action. 183 Pornography and hate speech promote inequality,
and one effect of that is to harm the victims as speakers, but the process seems more diffusely connect to silencing dmn infringement is,
even if the amount of silencing is as great or greater.
In addition, much discomfort with proposed regulations of pornography (and hate speech) comes from the perceived impossibility
of tailoring regulation to that which silences women. A variety of nonsexually-explicit demeaning images and stories affect women's ability
to speak and be heard. Against tllat background, it is hard to imagine
tllat eliminating pornography would materially affect women's speech
incentives or credibility. Ironically, copyright's breadth seems more
acceptable as an incentive scheme because its wide coverage makes it
more likely to achieve its goal. Inquiry into me<:hanisms of silencing
sugges~ a version of a tailoring requirement. A speech-promoting
speech restriction should be targeted to cover bad, speechSee, e.g. MAcKINNON, supra note 138, at 108.
But if. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expressi(l/I, III HARV. L. lU:v. 1149
(1998); Weinreb, Fair Use, supra note 79, at 1305-06 (noting the absence of significallt
empirical evidence about copyright's incentive effects).
182

183
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suppressing speech. If it covers substantially more or less than that,
then the law is not really promoting speech. Copyright law does not
currently work this way, but it should.

,.

c. Diversity

Copyright seems to be content-neutral because it regulates all
speech.184 By contrast, racist and pornographic speech often have a
predictable and politically charged content. Yet, copyright's interest in
promoting diversity and new expression is, ultimately, content-based
in the sense that the term is usually used. ,file usually demand that
mechanisms of speech regulation be content-neutral because we fear
government oppression, but we have a legitimate content-based preference for a rich and diverse array of speech.l85 Thus, copylight suggests tlIat certain broad content-based preferences are acceptable
justifications for government regulation.
"'When courts and commentators declare tlmt protecting authors'
expression ensures a wi.de variety of expression ratller than a flood of
copies, they invoke diversity principles.ISG Diversity is a preference for
certain kinds of content: new expression tlmt would be less prevalent
in the absence of regulation. IS7 Ex ante, diversity might seem neutral,
because Congress cannot be sure when it establishes a copyright law
whose ox will be gored, just as legislatures cannot be sure who will use
a libel law. The content discrimination comes in ex post, when a preference for variety over repetition punishes copiers and favors transformative uses.188 In tlle case of libel law, at least, tlle ex post effects
SeeFraser, supra note 17, at 10.
See Associated Press Y. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945) ("[The First Amcndment) rests on the assumption that the \\idest possiblc disscmination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the wclfare of thc public, that a free press is
a condition of a free society.").
186 See Tunzer J, 512 U.S. at 677 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part)
("Preferences for diversity of viewpoints, for location, for educational programming, and
for news and public affairs all make reference to contenL").
187 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. y. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.s. 1,20 (1986) ("[T]he
State's asserted interest in c."posing appellant's cllstomcrs to a \':nict}' of \icwpoints is
not-and does not purport to be--content neutral."); Lemlcy & Volokh, supm note 124, at
2447. Then:Justice Rehnquist's dissent, by contrast, argues that gO\'crnment decisions that
affect the mix of content available to the public :n'e not problcmatic unless thc actioll ""P'
proximates that of direct content-bascd suppression of speech." Padfic Gas, 475 U.s. at 29
(Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
188 See Voloklt & McDonnell, supra note 57, at 2447 ("[C]opyrightliabilit)' turns 011 the
content of what is published. True, thc law draws no ideological distinctions.••• But while
this might make the law "\iewpoint-ncutral, it doesn't makc it content-ncutral.").
1st

185
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that disadvantage defendants are enough to subject libel law to faidy
intense judicial scrutiny.189
The upshot of the diversity preference is that copyright has a disparate impact on various kinds of works and speakers. Yet it is 110t
clear that the First Amendment erects any barrier to neuU'allaws that,
although reasonable and limited, nonetheless have a disparate impact
on some group, especially if that group is not. historically disadvantaged.
Radical theorists argue for a change in government regulation
precisely on the grounds that the speech suppressed under the current regime should be more widely available. We need government to
balance the scales so that certain disfavored people have a chance to
be heard. Some of the radical theorists think they know what these
unheard voices would say; others remain more agnostic. As a matter
of democratic self-governance, it may be u'oubling that any group is
silenced no matter what it might say, and particular attention to the
silence of historically disadvantaged groups makes constitutional
sense (for Fourteenth Amendment, Carolene Products-type reasons).
Perhaps copyright is less troubling than other market-failure
theories because copyright promotes diversity of expression, not diversity of ideas, and only the latter is a troubling kind of diversity preference. But recall dle argument of Part LA that expression and ideas
are intertwined in ways that are difficult to sort out. Ideas have no
form without expression. Furthermore, without copyright, no one
would have property rights in ideas in any event; the incentive to have
a "new" idea and clothe it in expression could well be diminished
without copyright. Therefore, copyright's protection for ideas works
in tandem with its protection of expression. 190
The bias of copyright may differ in another way from the biases
in other speech-promoting regulations. Copyright's goal is not just
189 The fear is either that libel law wiII have a disparate impacl on ccrtain gl'OUpS that
wiII be impossible to tease out case-by-case or that too much speech will be stlppl'csscd
regardless of whether any identifiable group is affected. As I argucd in Section 1.A, one
could make the same case against copyright,
190 While copyright's main incentive function is to encourage vrlricd cxprcssion, that in
itself tends to encourage different viewpoints and different subjccts. Evcn thc l'chllivc1y
idea-free example of Hollywood moviemaking shows how the principlc works. 1'i/(II/;cwag II
success, but only one studio reaped the direct monetary benefits of the movic; othcl's had
to figure out how to take advrlntage of the audience's passion for the story. Thus Lconardo
DiCaprio gets to star in many other movies, with different storics; thus we get anothcl'
summer of disaster films; thus we get a slew of period pieces. All thcse are stmtcgics fOi'
taking part of Titanic, some part that copyright does not protect, and tul'lling it into copyrighted gold. In the process, we get different ideas, not just differcnt cxprcssion.
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diversity but al1wunt Qf speech-let a thQusand nQvels bloom. I dO' not
believe that the distinctiQn between diversity and amount O'f speech is
meaningful, hQwever. One CQuld make the same claim about campaign finance refQrm, hate speech regulatiO'n, antipornography O'rdinances, and sO' O'n. Such restrictiO'ns 'wO'uld enable many vO'ices heretofQre silent to' begin speaking, regardless O'f what thO'se vO'ices might
say. MQre fundamentally, the spatial metaphO'r fQr measuring speech
becQmes fairly useless at this pO'int. Assume that, withO'ut cO'pyright,
peQple wO'uld spend less time cO'mmunicating their thO'ughts to one
anQther, since there wO'uld be less prQfit in it. V{e wO'uld have to' make
up O'ur O'wn stQries to' entertain O'urselves individually. "'{O'uld there
really be "fewer" stO'ries? Or WQuld we have the "same" number O'f
thQughts, O'nly less advanced because they would not be enriched by
O'thers'? While I believe that twO' peO'ple may well imprO've the 100gic
and persuasiveness Qf their beliefs by exchanging ideas, I am not sure
it is apprQpriate to' say that the "number" O'f ideas chmlges thrO'ugh
cQmmunicatiQn. CO'pyright lends itself to' cO'unting mO're easily thml
O'ther fQrms O'f speech regulatiO'n, perhaps, because it is easier to'
measure the number Qf magazines Qn a shelf thml it is to' measure diversity Qf viewpO'ints. But that still dQes nO't tell us whether a billiO'n
cQpies Qf a biO'graphy O'f LeO'nardO' DiCapriO' is a better free speech
gQal than ten thQusand cQpies each O'f ten thO'usmld different biO'graphies.
"MQre" speech is nQt just abO'ut having more alternative \iewpO'ints Qr nQvels frO'm which to' chO'O'se, but about having more tO'O'ls
"with which to' make new speech. Diversity in the marketplace is usually
cQnceived Qf at static slices O'f time: mO're chO'ices fO'r consumers
means mO're diversity. Diversity Qf speech is a different mlimal, as the
theQry behind CQPyright demO'nstrates; the vmiety available at O'ne
time affects what 'will be available later Qn. The preference fO'r a dynamic diversity, O'ne that allQWS speakers to' generate new speech, is a
CQntent preference, but it is a justified O'ne.
Whatever O'ne thinks O'f the regulatiO'n O'f hate speech mld pO'rnQgraphy, cQmparison with cQPyright theO'ry is useful to' identify
grO'unds Qn which O'ne cO'uld prQmO'te O'r cO'ndemn pm·ticular gO'vernment actiQns that penalize SQme speakers to encourage O'thers. In
the end, whether a regulatiQn is "cO'ntent-based" may nO't be as important as whether we can define mld defend its predictable effects O'n
variQUS grQUPS Qf speakers.
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3. Campaign Finance Reform
Campaign finance reform raises similar questions of whether a
speech regulation designed to improve one group's access to speech,
which therefore has a predictable disparate impact on a different
group, is legitimate.
The strongest justifications for campaign finance reform rest on
some theory that lack of regulation has poisoned the system by which
information about candidates gets to voters. I9l The general idea is
that no one really wants the situation we have, but that most partici
pants are forced to play the big-spending game because of a collective
action problem, a Prisoner's Dilemma. Some proponents of reform
argue that unlimited spending by candidates leads to a system in
which challengers (who may have difficulty getting contributions
when challenging a proven candidate) or less wealthy candidates are
drowned out. I92 Large modern campaigns require huge "war chests,"
which in turn drives politicians to solicit wealthy donors 01' interest
groups, creating a system in which money buys influence. I!)!! Justice
Breyer has thus endorsed the proposition that campaign finance
regulation is justified as a speech-promoting speech restriction, pre
venting the few from drowning out the many.I94
Still another argument for reform is that modern campaigning is
an "arms race" in which, for defensive reasons, politicians have to
spend so much time on fund-raising that they have no time for governance. Some speech and deliberation-fund-raising speechcrowds out speech and deliberation about what to do in office. CmuM
paign finance reform, then, will not necessarily change the l'ange of
views available to the public, but it will improve the quality of public
service. R~gulation of campaign finance will, it is argued, produce
M

M

ee David A. Strauss, 1l1mt Is the Goal oJCampaigll Finance ReJorlll? 1995 U. CHI. Lt!141 (discussing various justifications proffered by reformcrs).
192 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2470, 2479-80 (1997)
[hereinafter Fiss, Money and Politics] (arguing that a democratic undcrstanding of the First
Amendment requires the equalization of political opportunity through rcgulations 011
campaign spending).
193 SeeFEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480. 496-97 (1985)
(stating that "preventing corruption or the appcarance of corruption» is "thc only Icgitlmate compelling governmcnt interest thus far idcntificd for rcstricting campaign
finances"); Fiss, Money and Politics, supra note 192, at 2478-79 (arguing that unrcstricted
campaign finance spending gives untoward power to the wealthy, distorting political equality contrary to First Amendment principles).
194 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 120 S. Ct. 897. 905 (2000)'(B.'cycr.J ••
concurring) .
1915

GAL F.
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more democratic deliberation.195 Just as copyright can be att.'1cked fOl'
promoting the interests of wealthy corporations, campaign finance
reform is often criticized as an incumbent-protection measure. Incumbents have greater access to non-monetary assets such as an ability to get free media exposure and name recognition. Therefore, the
argument goes, campaign finance reform, by restricting campaign
expenditures, will increase the relative import.'l.llCe of these incmnbent-favoring assets,
In the campaign finance context, the Supreme Court held that it
is a content preference to fear that some speech, because it is backed
by deep pockets, will drown out other speech. To the Court, campaign
finance regulations evinced a content-based concern with comnlllllicative impact.196 Campaign finance reformers, by contrast, consider
regulation content-neutral, a concern with the volume of speech
rather than its ideas. But, because the "volume" of political ads bears a
fairly clear relationship to their ability to persuade, and the volume of
a loudspeaker does not, the Court saw content discrimination. Like
the different-mechanisms argument discussed in the preceding subsection, this judgment depends on the characterization of money as
something that enables speech rather than as a mechanism by which
certain speech makes its mark on the world.
In tandem 'with its characterization of limits on campaign spending as content-based, the Supreme Court rejected the democratic,
speech·equalization rationales for campaign finance reform, on the
theory that the speech of some should not be suppressed to enhance
the relative voice of others.197 Like copyright, there is no ex ante restriction, but once the political season begins, the restrictions affect
who can speak or what can be said. 19B Also like copyright, campaign
finance reform challenges us to recognize the relation betl\"een
money and speech-money generates speech, in copyright by
financing the production and distribution of speech, and similarly in
195 See, e.g., Vmcent Blasi, Free SpeedL and the n7delling ~",r oJ Fund·Raisillg; mry Cam,
paign Spendi1lg limits May Not Violate the First Amendmellt After /W. 94 CoLUM. 1.. RE\,. 1281
(1994).
196 SeeBuckleyv. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976).
197 See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. Cily of Berkeley. 4:;'1 U.s. 290, 298-300
(1981); Buckle)" 424 U.S. at 48-49. Academic critics of campaign financc reform also argue
that government nonintervention is the natural baseline for a regimc of free speech. &to,
e.g., Lillian R BeVier, Compaign Finance ReJOn/I: SPedolls Llrgulllellts, [lItmdabit'DilellllllaS, 9·1
CoLm-I. L. REv. 1258, 1260-61 (1994).
198 See Blasi, supra note 195, at 1292 (discussing ways in which r.,cially ncutral campaign
finance reform might favor certain ideological interests over othcrs).
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campaign finance. The desire for money affects the content of inclividual speakers' speech, as publishers seek to produce popular material or candidates solicit the support of wealthy donors.
Copyright and campaign finance reform are linked not only by
their market-failure theories but also by a concern for democracy, in
the sense that both theories postulate that citiz(!ns should have aCCeSS
to many speakers saying many different things. Some people criticize
the radical theories because they seem to make the state responsible
for deciding what is good for people, deciding which stories have not
been sufficiently successful in reaching a sympathetic audience. Robert Post, for example, finds Owen Fiss's emphasis on getting information out into the public sphere so that people can decide how to vote
unappealing because it "offers a strikingly passive image of the democratic citizen, who can be brought to identify with collective selfdetermination merely by being provided with ... full and accurate
information. "199
The radical theorists, however, disagree with this characterization
because to tllem there should be no easy line between speakers and
audiences. Currently, some people talk too much when they should
be listening, and vice versa, but that is not inevitable. Integrating
copyright into other theories about how the state constructs the conditions for speech helps illuminate how no citizc:m, on either the creative/speaking or the copying/listening side, is passive. Copyright's
understanding of how audiences can rework expression to suit their
own purposes suggests that even what we think of as passive listening
may be more active than sharp distinctions between listening and
speaking admit. Access to multiple viewpoints is important not just so
citizens can choose, but so they can create their own viewpoints.
Campaign .finance reform has similarly democratic aspirations, as it
attempts to enhance the political voice of groups that may currently
lack the means to be heard, both by directly decreasing the importance of money and by eliminating the fund-raising pressures that
may lead politicians to devote insufficient time to the issues.
A distinction between campaign finance reform and copyright
may therefore rest on predictions about the groups affected by the
two regulations. Campaign finance reform affects rich people, a
group that seems smaller and more stable-thm; more politically vul199 Robert Post, Equality alldAlItollomy in First Amencimelltjllrisprllciellce, 95 MICII. L. R!;\,.
1517, 1526 (1997) (reviewing OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVlDlm: FREEDOM 01-' SI'EECII &:
THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996».
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nerable-than the authors protected by copyright (never mind that
the real beneficiaries of copyright are often from the same group).
Various aspects of First Amendment law are structured to minimize disparate effects on identifiable groups, as with libel law, where
we predict that unconstrained juries will be too sympathetic to the
powerful and unsympathetic to their challengers to preserve vigorous
reporting and editorializing. Campaign finance reform raises the
same concerns. Similarly, we ought to see copyright, and its e.xceptions, as a law with predictable content-based effects, which should
therefore be subject to some heightened review. Because of copyright's breadth, however, the standard tests for constitutionality of
speech regulations may be too stringent; copyright, and perhaps other
regulations, may deserve scrutiny limited to the reasonableness of
Congress's line-drawing. But when speech is directIy regulated, is tIle
inquiry ever limited to mere rationality as WitIl a standard economic
regulation, or must courts demand some tIling more from Congress?
The next section addresses tI1at question.
4. TurnerBroadcastingand Semi-Content-Neutral. Regulation
Must-carry regulations are tIle only speech-promoting regulations
upheld in their entirety in recent years. The Court's articulation of a
theory that allowed tI1ese regulations to persist, despite tIleir substantial and direct effects on cable providers' speech, provides valuable
guidance for what serious First Amendment analysis of copyright
would look like.
Must-carry regulations ensure tI1at cable systems carry local
broadcasters at no charge, if the broadcasters so desire. The fear tIlat
prompted enactment of the must-carry law was that cable providers
would shut local broadcasters out of tIleir systems, tIl1.lS destroying tIle
local stations that h;ad served regional populations for decades before
the development of cable. Local stations, in tIleory, carry local news,
as well as educational and informational programming tImt might not
otherwise be found on cable.2OO The crowding-out oflocal stations was
linked to cable technology, which made it inconvenient for a viewer to
switch back and fortI1 between cable and local broadcast.
!!OO This is in part because the governmcnt rcquires broadcast Iiccnsees to serve the
public interest by offering such programming, whilc it does not similarl}" dcmand public
interest programming from cable prO\idcrs, though it does require that cable pro\iders
allow certain favored groups (local governmcnt and educational organizmions) to nCCl'SS
some cable channels.
.
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The Turner I Court held that "the mere assertion of dysfunctioll
or failure in a speech market, without more, is not sufficient to shield
a speech regulation from the First Amendment standards applicable
to nonbroadcast media. "201 The Court emphasized that laws that Sill~
gle out the press are always subject to some heightened First Amelld~
ment scrutiny.202 The Court then invoked Unitt'd States v. O'Brien203 as
the basis for its analysis, despite very different situations. O'Brien COll~
cerned a regulation banning the destruction of draft cards that was
used to prosecute an antiwar protestel: It set forth a test for conduct
regulations that have an incidental impact on expression, whereas the
Cable Act directly regulated expression.
The Turner I Court used O'Brien because it found that none of
Congress's interests in must-carry were related to tlle suppression of
free expression. 204 In fact, the multiplication of information SOUl'ces is
"a governmental purpose of the highest order. "205 The Court, how~
ever, demanded a showing that the threatened harms to free televi~
sion, diversity of information sources, and fair competition in the
programming market were real and that regulation would alleviate
those harms in a direct and material way.206 In addition, the govel'11~
ment had the burden of showing that its regulation did not burden
substantially more speech than necessary.207 Thus, the Court defel'l'ed
to Congress as a fact-finder; once it determin(!d that Congress had
carried out its fact-finding responsibilities, it accorded great weight to
the problems Congress identified and the rem(!dies Congress chose.
At the same time, the Court scrutinized the Cable Act carefully in ol'~
del' to determine whether, if the facts were as Congress found them to
be, the Act regulated only as much speech as necessary to achieve
Congress's aims.
The Turner I Court justified its somewhat relaxed test for direct
regulation of speech on the ground that the must-carry law was con~
201

Tumer 1, 512 U.S. at 640.

202 See id. at 640-41.
203 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

See Tumer 1, 512 U.S. at 662.
Id. at 663. justice Breyer's Turner II concurrence explicitly recognized that the
Court was balancing speech interests on both sides-cablc carriers on one, the public Interest in having a wide variety of sources available on the oth(~r. See TImler II, 520 U.S. at
226 (Breyer,j., concurring). Because important First Amendment interests existed on both
sides,justice Breyer found that the key question was one of "fit." The Court had to determine whether significantly less restrictive alternatives existed and whether the balance
between speech-enhancing and speech-restricting functions was reasonable. See ill.
206 See Tumer 1, 512 U.S. at 664.
207 See id. at 664-65.
204

205
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tent-neutral. The test for content neutrality, it stated, was whether the
government adopted a regulation because of agreement or disagreement with a message. 208 Also, laws that "by their terms distinguish £.vored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views
expressed are content based. "209 This definition seems like a better
description of viewpoint regulation, since we usually think of contentbased regulations as covering obscenity, libel, or other classes of
speech that may have a broad range of "messages. n Indeed, Justice
O'Connor declared in dissent that Congress's preference for the topics
covered by broadcast stations-local news, public affairs, educational
programs, etc.-constituted a content preference.!!10
208

See id. at 642.

209

la. at 643.

210 Turner I also seems to conflict ,\ith Hurll!}' tl lrisll-Jillll'liCatl Gay, Lrsbiall & Bisrxllal
Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), the parade <A'lSe. Hu'rlt:)' noted that the o~nizers of Boston's
St. Patrick's Day parade let in multiple messages. often disconncctcd from one ,mother, so
that it was hard to say that tllere was any particular themc to the paradc. ~ it!. at 569. \'Ct
"a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protcction simply by combining Illultifarious voices, or by failing to edit tlleir tllemes to isolate an exact message as the exdush'e
subject matter of me speech." ld. at 569-70. Even tllOugh tll('re was no particular message,
me parade could not be forced to add another messagNhrcad to the o\'crall tapestry.
Hurley distinguished TImler I because tlle Hur/t:)' Court tllought that people
would beliC\'e that tlle organizers endorsed any signs in the parade, C\'cn though the C\i·
dence showed tllat tlle organizers almost nC\'er c.xercised control o\'er signs. ~ icl. at 575.
The Court found that parades are not disconnected units like tclC\;sion programming but
unified wholes, C\'en when tlley lack a unified mess.,ge. Stt! id. at 576. This distinction seems
mistaken. Like a parade, telC\ision is often perceived as a unified experience, with disparate interlaced segments reflecting on one another. ~, t'.g.,JtUIES B. TWITCIIELL, C.\RNlYAL CULTURE: THE TRASHING OF TASTE IN AMERICA 195-96 (1992) (discussing smdies on
teIC\ision watching habits that rC\'eal tlmt average ,iewers treat watching as a process rath('r
tllan as a series of discrete C\·ents). Moreover, cable operators cannot disclaim an)' endorsement of NBC or PBS, because tllC}' are prohibited by law from altering the broadcast
signal on retransmission, so tlle Court's conclusion that cable operators can dissociate
themselves from must-carry channels is not persuash'e. The Court beliC\'ed that ~gi\'en
cable's long history of sening as a conduit for broadcast signals. there appears little risk
that cable viewers would assume tlmt tlle broadcast stations carried on a cable S\'Stem conYC}' ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator." TImltr I, 512 U.S. at 655: That long
history, howC\'er, was not produced by must-carl'}; caniagc was ,\,o!tmtal'}', and the natural
assumption of tlle average viewer would more likel}' be that broadcast carriage. like carriage of RBO and Showtime, was and continued to be the result of the cable operator's
choice. The Court noted tllat ,iewers are frequently apprised of the broadcaster's identit),.
See id.. Yet parade-goers in Boston were apprised of GUB's identity, and the bill recipients
were apprised of the public interest group's identity in Padfic Gas & Eltcllic Co. u Hutlsol/.
It was the forced inclusion of another's ,iews, despite the c.xplicit identification of that
otller, mat tlle Court found objectionable in those cases. Finally. tlle III1r/ry Coun also
invoked monopoly considerations to distinguish TImltr I: "fhe Go\'ernment's interest in
Tunzer Broadcasting was not tlle alteration of speech, but the suni\'al of speakers." Jlllr/ry,
515 U.S. at 577. The Court also emphasized that it was clear which message the parade
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Despite the conceptual difficulties, however, the Court found that
the must-carry provisions were content-neutral because they required
carriage of broadcast stations regardless of the views those stations
expressed. 2l1 The Court also found that the congressional purpose of
maintaining access to free television for all Americans was content~
neutral. According to the Court, Congress was not saying that bl'oadcast was more valuable than cable, just that it had value. 212 This seems
disingenuous, since Congress fairly clearly was expressing a preference for local programming over the alternatives that would otherwise appear on the cable channels reserved for must-carry. It might be
more accurate to say that must-carry is reasonably content-neutml,
and that the categories of speech it prefers are broad enough to be
acceptable, especially given the inevitable clash between cable and
broadcast speech created by the characteristics of the televisioll~
viewing audience.
Turner I and Turner II, which upheld Congress's balancing of interests after a full examination of the record, leave a very ullcertaiu
impression of what kind of congressional findings will suffice to justify
a speech regulation. 213 O'Brien itself did not distinguish between situa~
tions in which Congress was attentive to fact-finding and those in
which it was not. It applied a very deferential test in a case whel'e
Congress did not have much evidence before it. But the Turner cases
appear to modify that test, applying it to direct regulation of expression and holding that deference is appropriate, while requiring that

organizers disfavored, by letting in so many and excluding so few. See icl. at 574. It is less
clear which message cable prO\jders were trying to exclude when they opposed IIIl1st-cm'I'Y.
211 See Turner I, 512 U.S, at 643-44. 'When the D.C. Circuit analyzed other provisions of
the Cable Act, it used Turner analysis to uphold provisions mandating leased access to a
percentage of channels on cable systems reserved for programmers unalTIliated with cable
operators. The Court held that there was no content discrimination involved because the
law's preference operated in favor of certain speakers-those unalTIliated with c;,ble COllipanies-and not in favor of any message. See Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957,
969 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (distinguishing "sources" of information from "substance"). The
analogy to copyright is simple: Congress can prefer author-souf('es to copier-sources.
212 See Turner I, 512 U.S, at 648. The burden on cable operatol's was also cOlltcnt lieUtral, because the reduction in channel capacity available for their own choiccs opcl1lted
across the board and not upon channels with a particular viewpoint. See icl. lit 645.
213 See, e.g., William E. Lee, Manipulating Legislative Facts: The SlIpn'JIlI! COIII'I {l/ullhl! First
AlIlelldmCllt, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1261 (1998); Comment, COllstilutiollal Substalltial·Evicicl/(/! & ...
view? Lessons from the Supreme Collrt S Turner Broadcasting Decisiolls, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1162
(1997); Note, Deference to Legislative Fact DetemliTlations ill First AlIleJl(illll'llt Cases Aj1el'1'ul'llct'
Broadcasting, III HARV. L. REv. 2312 (1998).
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Congress be attentive to fact-finding. 2H The Court stated that its "sole
obligation" was to assure that Congress drew reasonable inferences
based on substantial evidence, because Congress is better equipped
than the courts to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data involved in complex regulation. 215
One implication of this reasoning is that, without dat.'l, Congress
is not in a better position to draw reasonable inferences than the
Court.216 Unaided speculation is not enough; Congress at least needs
some help speculating. The Court may also have been influenced by
the fact that economics and technology played large roles in TII17le1;
whereas the justification for regulation in O'Blien was essentially based
on the psychology of draft dodging. In cable regulation, and in copyright, there are clear economic pdnciples that e.xplain the
justification for the regulation, although the application of those
principles may be hotly contested.
Possibly, as in Tumer II, a speech-protective justification for regulation will make the Court's scrutiny less exacting than it would have
been had tlle law been enacted to protect children from corruption.
When speech interests exist on both sides of an issue, the courts must
tread carefully. They cannot just analyze tlle reasonableness of the
restdction, and they cannot assume tllat they know better than Congress even if tllere are content-based elements to a regulation. If
speech is opposed to speech, a decision not to regulate, or to regulate
in some other way, will also have content-based results. If the st.'\lldard
for legislation is set too high, speech will actually suffel~ as it probably
would if the Court struck down the Copyright Act in its entirety; if the
standard is too low, interest groups may capture the legislature and
overprotect some speech at tlle expense of other speech. (This is what
has occurred for years witll copydght term extension, e::-..-panded
rights of various sorts, and legal protection for anti-copying measures
that prevent even fair uses.)

214 See TUrIler II, 520 U.S. at 191-95. Essentially. the 7imltrca5eS applied the standard
rule that a content-neutral regulation ,,;11 be sustained if it ad\':tnces important gO\'Cmmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary, but took the requirement that the regulation actually
advance the identified government interest more seriously than O'B,im had. &to, t.g.• id. at
191 (referring to Congress's "explicit factual findings" and predictions codified in the
statutory statement of purpose).
215 Id. at 195.
216 See Comment, supra note 213, at 1175-76.
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A FEW IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT

Just as copyright's free speech justifications have implications fot'
the evaluation of other speech restrictions, free speech has implications for copyright. In the next few pages, I hope to offer a few examples of those implications, though many other things could be said.
Reconceiving copyright as speech-promotion law helps us understand
not just how to make copyright efficient at what it does, but what it
should do.
For example, I began this Article with a discussion of copyrighes
vagueness. I conclude, perhaps surprisingly, that vagueness is the necessary price of the benefits of copyright. (And the same might be true
of other speech-promoting speech regulations, though the evidence is
much less clear.)
Similarly, rethinking copyright as a speech-promotion device has
several implications for fair use; I will only discuss one. The £,ir use
preference for "noncommercial" uses should take account of what
general First Amendment law recognizes, which is that speech fot'
profit is not necessarily robustly "commercial." Much profit-seeking
speech is nonetheless easily suppressed or deformed, and COlIntletdality as it has been understood in fair use doctrine should be narrowed in a manner more consistent with general free speech law.
Finally, I suggest a framework for evaluating copyrighes effects on
speech that takes account of Congress's ability to find relevant facts,
an endeavor that Turner puts at the center of free speech analysis and
that will be vital for any other speech-promoting speech regulation.
A. The Importance of Vagueness

The problems of vagueness discussed in Part I seem particularly
problematic given that there are speech interests on both sides of any
copyright dispute. Assuming tllat people are generally risk averse,217
vagueness chills speech on both sides, although vagueness is almost

217 Even if insurance can make some entities risk-neutral, all that is really required to
make this argument work is that some entities are risk-averse and that they arc l'audolllly
distributed between the universes of potential copyright plaintiffs and potcutial delclldants, universes which overlap. Volokh and McDollnell discuss dlC possibility that coprright liability is just a cost of doing business, not a drag on speech. As with libel law, cxpansh'e copyright will deter even risk-neutral entities from producing' matcrial with a lowc!'
profit potential because of the risk of liability, thus changing (p{'rhaps evcn dccrc"sing.
when investors shift from newspaper to toilet paper) the kinds of 1-pecch "vai/ablc. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 57, at 2448.
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universally discussed as detrimental to the interests of a copier.218 We
get less original production because authors (and their publishers)
cannot be certain of capturing enough of the gains of creativity. and
we get less copying because legitimate users cannot be sure they will
be able to fend off infiingement claims. This seems like a lose-lose
situation.
Eugene Volokh and Brett McDonnell have offered one way for
courts to decrease First Amendment-copyright tensions. Appellate
courts could review de novo findings of infi"ingement where the case
rests on substantial similarity. They argue that this practice would <!1low the circuits to build a body of case law that would enhance predictability.219 They take as models to be emulated the appellate-courtsupervised development of the law of fair use, libel and defamation,
obscenity, and the Fow-th Amendment.
This list, however, does not really recommend itself as a set of
models of adjudicative deliberation and clarity. In fact, evel), one of
these areas is pretty much a mess, the Fourth Amendment most of all,
despite the fact that appellate courts spend appalling amounts of time
and paper sorting out Fourth Amendment cases.220 Even if libel and
the like formed coherent bodies of law, I am not sure how well the
lesson would apply. Libel, defamation, and obscenity lack the infinite
variety of copyright. In libel and defamation. the actual malice requirement does most of the speech-protective work, and the doctrine
is further limited to the subset of speech that is widely understood to
be damaging to the target. Obscenity is confined to the graphically
sexual; the potential variations between challenged publications are
on the order of "Insert Tab A into Slot B." In copyright, by conU-ast. it
is difficult to understand how a finding in one case will aid others in
any but the vaguest of ways. Subst:c°mtial similarity rests on compruing
the plaintiff's work to the defendrult's, not to rulY social consensus or
paradigm work. Volokh and McDonnell do not actually offer rulY vision of what concrete, explicit principles of SUbSt:c'llltial similru·ity
might look like, and their silence highlights the difficulty in\'olved
when trying to analogize from an infiingemellt case o\'er 12 MOll218 See supra note 58 and supra note 79. ''<>lokh and l\IcDonncll arc the first to recognize the vagueness problem on both sides. See ''<>lokh & McDonne1\, sllpra note 57, at 2....9.
I suspect this belated recognition stems precisely from the increasing C01l\"ergence of coprright's "speech on both sides" paradigm ,\1th the radic..ll theories of speech.
219 See Volokh & McDonnell, supra 110te 57.
220 See William Stuntz, TIre Uneasy RelatiollshiP lkh,r«11 C,imillal Promlllrr allli Crimillal
Justice, 107YALELJ_1 (1997).
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keyS221 to one over The Devil's Advocate: Are four points of similarity
enough? How does similar color stack up against similar shape?!!!!!!
Whatever predictability results from the Volokh and McDonnell proposal would largely stem from the numbers--there are fewer potential
threejudge panels thanjuries. 223
The attempt to decrease uncertainty substantially is futile, because vagueness in defining the scope of copyright is the price we pay
for speech.224 Arguably, most vagueness law serves to contract the
number of situations in which the government can punish speech, as
it is harder to define punishable speech than to identi.ty it ill practice.
In copyright, though, it would be very difficult to live without an
ideal expression distinction or a fair use exception. More certain regimes (no copyright at all, for example) would be even worse for
speech. 225

B. Commercial Speech: Turning Two Meanings into One

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union gives some guidance about what other aspects of a First
221See Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
222 The copyright lawyers consulted by Volokh and McDonncll scem fairly split 011 thc
question of whether more appellate rcview of idea/exprcssion cascs would help. Somc
thought that nothing would clarity the distinction. See Volokh & McDollncll, SlIprtlllote 57,
at 2456. One thought that "the more cases decided, the morc likely it is that you can Hnd II
rationale for your argument because not all courts are going 10 agrec." lei. at 2457 (quOling Blaine Greenberg). Da\id Nimmer thought that life would be easier "if there WCI'C
fewer benchmark cases." ld.
2"..3 Cj Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 57 (discussing copyright lawyers' rcasolls fOl'
paying more attention to circuit court cases than to district court cascs), That's Ilot peanuts, but it's not terribly principled either.
224 Cj 'Weinreb, Fair Use, supra note 79, at 1309 (arguing that unprcdictability cannot
be eliminated from fair use because the doctrine is inherently multifilceted and sitltaliolldependent) .
225 My defense of vagueness resembles the argument in Dan M. Kahan, 19/1ortltut' of
Law Is all Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REv. 127 (1997). Knhall aI'glle$ that
vagueness in the criminal law is often .1 good thing, because it encourages mom I belmviol'
rather than immoral adherence to the letter of the law, Copyright's vaguencss lIIay be desirable inasmuch as bright-line rules would be more destructive of authors' incentives
(whether as primary creators or as users of elements of cop}Tighted material). One
significant distinction between Kahan's argument and mine is that Knhan sees the Mchilling" effect of vague criminal laws as a good thing, whereas I suspect thnt the (I;lIIgers cn."
ated by copyright are a necessary price for flexibility. However, 1<4lhan's argumcnt dlllt
good citizens should ask themselves whether their conduct is right, as well as whcthcl' it is
la\\{ul, resonates in copyright. Copyright may be easiest to obey when it tracks o\\r 1110111\
norms about ownership, plagiarism, and rights in one's own books and tapes. &oc Weinreb,
Fail" Use, supra note 79, at 1307-{)8.
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Amendment-influenced copyright would look like.2!!G The Court
struck down portions of the Communications Decency Act which exposed people and entities using the Internet to liability if minors
could access indecent speech. In the process, the Court's opinion repeatedly emphasized the dangers posed by the Act to noncommercial
speakers, for whom the profit motive did not operate as a counterbalance to the threat of liability and who would therefore be more easily
deterred from speaking than commercial speakers.227 This reasoning
suggests a free speech justification for nm-rowing the commerciality
prong of fair use.
The current explanation of the commercial/noncommercial pm·t
of the fair use test states that commercial uses m'e more likely than
noncommercial uses to capture the copyright owner's mm·ket. Not
only is this highly debatable-certainly repeated mld widespread noncommercial use can eliminate a potential mm'ket, say for videotapes of
popular shows or sound files of populm' recordings22lL-it also faces
substantial baseline problems defining what e.xactly tlle copyright
owner's "market" should be. This explanation invites claims tlmt, if
liability is imposed, a market autllorized by tlle cop}'light owner will
develop; these claims then produce tlle conclusion tllat economic
harm is caused by the challenged use because tlle autllOI1zed mm'ket
never materializes.229
The circulaIity of the market-based m'gument creates a need for a
better justification, and free speech has it in standm'd explmmtions for
regulating commercial speech. Commercial speech is robust enough,
because of the profit motive, to generate a broad range ofworks.230 A
defendant who believes tllat she has made a commercially successful
product may be more willing to litigate a potential infringement,
whereas a defendant making a noncommercial use will likely have
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
See id. at 850.
228 The current distinction also imites courts to stretch the meaning of "commercial"
when they really mean that a noncommercial use may cause market harm. SIr. e.g.. \\'orld·
wide Church of God Y. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding that copying religious te.xt that was gi\'en away was "commercial" becausc it at·
tracted new members to a church); A & 1\1 Records \'. Napstcr, Inc., 114 F. Sup}>. 2d 89G
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding indhiduals' free music filc-sharing "commercial" becausc carried
out on a large scale among strangers).
229 See, e.g., American Geophysical Union y. Te.xaco, GO F.3d 913. 937 (2tl Cir. 1995)
Uacobs,j., dissenting); Weinreb, Fair Use, supra note 79, at 1296.
230 CJ. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. \'. Public Sen'. Comm'n. 447 U.S. 557. 564 n.G
(1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy". Va. Citizens Consumer Council. 425 U.S. 748. ii2 n.24
(1976).
226

227
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neither the resources nor the inclination to risk a large judgment
against her. But this would also invite courts to look more carefully at
what a "commercial" use is. Not every part of a publication is cccom~
mercial" in the same way, even when the publisher wants to make
money; advertisements are commercial speech. in First Amendment
law but the news stories right above them in the newspaper are not.!!!!l
A publisher is probably more willing to suppn:5s the content of any
particular story for fear of liability, whether for copyright infringe~
ment or another reason, than to suppress an ad. Therefore, unless
near-verbatim copying is at issue-suggesting that the publisher is get~
ting commercial advantage from copying and has not done anything
else to attract consumers-courts should not let profit-seeking weigh
very heavily in a non-advertising commercial use. And courts should
be leery of imposing any liability for nonprofit uses, because they are
more fragile and easily suppressed.
This interpretation would bring the meaning of "commercial" in
copyright closer to its meaning in free speech law. In copyright,
"commercial" use is defined broadly, as any speech disseminated for
profit. Although the Supreme Court in Campbell rejected the proposi~
tion that a profit-seeking use is presumptively unfair when the use is
also transformative, it did not reject the idea that anything that peo~
pIe pay for is commercial use as far as copyright is concerned. By con~
trast, in the First Amendment context commercial speech is deter~
mined by three factors: whether the speech is an advertisement;
whether it refers to a specific product or service; and whether the
speaker has an economic motive for the speech. 232
There is an underlying relationship between commerciality in
free speech and in copyright. The first two factors of the free speech
test have less to do 'with the justification for lessened protection for
commercial speech-its robustness-than the third. The first two fac
tors instead cabin the principle of commercial robustness against the
expansion of speech regulation. If the speech is an advertisement that
refers to a specific product or service, it may be easy for the speaker to
communicate its core message even in the presence of government
regulation. In other cases, the core of the message may not have
much intrinsic relationship to the commercial motive, as when a pu~
lisher chooses to publish books it believes will be best-sellers, regardless of whether the topic is Chicken Soup for the Teenage Soul or 101 Uses
M

231

See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 V.S. 484 (1996).
Young Drug Prods. Corp., 463 V.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).

232See Bolgerv.
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for a Dead Cat. 'Where the message and the motive have a looser relationship, the content of speech is vulnerable to government-induced
deformity even though the speaker intends to keep saying something
despite regulation. Thus, such speech is not "commercial" in general
free speech law; it is noncommercial speech for profit.
Noncommercial speech for profit is the speech on which copyright's incentive function operates. Advertisements do not need the
inducement of copyright; the profit to be gained fi:om selling the underlying goods would support Madison Avenue in any event. Copyright is designed to encourage precisely those creators (or, more accurately, those investors in creative work) who want to make mone),
and whose profit motive is not as strongly tied to the message of the
copyrighted work.
We can therefore identifY three kinds of message-motive connections. For ads, the message is "buy X," and the moti\'e is profit from
selling X. For general speech sold in the market, the message varies
and the motive is profit from selling the speech, and maybe proselytizing, too. Finally, for nonprofit speech, the message varies and the motive is something other than profit.233 The first class of speech is particularly robust,234 although the Supreme Court has recentIy
cautioned that tile government still needs substantial justification to
regulate it.
The second class is susceptible to deformation and needs greater
protection from regulation. 235 Government regulation of such speech
may be particularly disturbing for tile vel'y reason tImt a profitmotivated speaker may keep speaking, only 'witil different content, if
the government regulates speech. The market will appear robust and
free, but it will be pervaded by government-induced distortion. Profit-

!!33 cf Ma.xtone-Graham Y. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1986); William F.
Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Miscollstrued: Profit, PmlllllptiollS, alld Porrxl.r. 11 CARDOZO
.ARTS & ENT. LJ. 667,679-81 (1993) (suggesting a continuum of comlllcrcialily).
!!34 Cf Leval, supra note 80, at 1116 n.53 (WPcrhaps at thc c.xtreme of commcrcialism,
such as advertising, the statute provides little tolerance for claims of fhir usc. ").
!!35 See Campbell Y. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994) (holding that
commercial use weighs against a finding of fair use, but it is only one r.,ctor and "C\"Cn the
force of tllat tendenC)' \\ill \'at'}' \\itll tlle contc.xt"); Ma....:tollt-Graholll, 803 F.2d at 1262 (holding tltat "tlle commcrcialnature of a use is a matter of degree" and that an anti-abortion
book sold for profit was first and foremost a work of political opinion sllch thal its COIIImercial character did not weigh against a finding of fair usc); Wojmlro\\icz \'. Amcrican
Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding thOll, whilc a fundraising 1110ti\'ation for a political pamphlet had some commercial }llll]>OSC, its precmincnt purpose
was to express a political \iC\\]>oint, and tlle laller purpose outweighed lhe cOlllmcrcialily).
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seeking should therefore not inherently weigh against the defendant
in a fair use analysis.
The third class lacks even a generalized profit motive and is likely
to be particularly fragile and deserving of heightened scrutiny when
regulated. The absence of profit suggests that the motive has something to do witll the specific message being communicated, which deserves special consideration in a free speech analysis. 236 Noncommercial copyright uses may have market effects, but they still deserve
special favor because they represent communication that could easily
be suppressed. 237
C. Institutional Competence

Who will decide where to draw the line, Congress or tlle courts?
Though courts will defer to congressional judgments about many factual situations, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
the judiciary must ultimately determine whether laws are consistent
with the First Amendment. Where First Amendment interests compete, however, the difficulties are compounded. Assuming tllat copyright contains some speech-enhancing element'3, a range of possible
regimes could work, depending on an assessment of the empirical

236 Distinguishing message from motive can also distinHuish variolls types of ml~.
Therefore, I disagree with the statement in Campbell that parodying a work to advertlsc all
unrelated product is entitled to less protection than the sale of a parody for its olVn sake.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585. An ad that evokes copyIighted material to make :In lIlII'elated
product attractive, such as a beer ad that satirizes ads for batteries, see Eveready BaHct'y Co.
v. Adolph Coors Co" 765 F. Supp.440 (N.D. III. 1991),01' imitates a rap gl'oup's l'cdol'lll'
ance, see Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. l\Iiller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp.826 (S.D.N.V. 1990), Is
arguably more deserving of fair use protection than an ad for a product that itself (ontains
copyIighted work and trades on the appeal of that work to sell the pl'Oduct, sei! Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cil'. 1979). An ad
can potentially try to sell beer and lampoon social phenomena at the same timc. If the
Coors family can donate beer money to political causes, it sllCluld also be allowcd to gct
extra bang for its advertising bucks by social commentary in ads-the advcrtising vct'sioll
of doing good by doing well. Cf. Nina Munk, Levi's Ongoi1lg Quest for Sireet Cn:d, Fotl't'UN'-'!,
Feb. 1, 1999, at 40 (discussing Levi's campaign in which young people talk "fmnkly"lIuout
cutting school and the benefits of inequality under capitalism).
237 The true believe!; of course, may well continue to proselytize (or infringe) no mat·
tel' what the sanctions; punishment may even seem like vindkation to him. See Negati\'.
land, supra note 55. But many people may not have the ability to continue to comlllunicate
their messages if their websites are shut down or their presses forfeited. They may continue
to believe, but their beliefs will not be readily available to the rest of us.
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validity of claims about encouraging rewards for creativity versus allowing creators to draw on what has come before.2S8
The Court has rejected suggestions that it should evaluate the
extent of a patent monopoly to determine whether it was the best way
to promote the useful arts. 239 The Court emphasized the explicit constitutional grant of power to Congress: ",t\1}len as here the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can
come only from Congress. "240 Yet in Graham v. John Deere Co., the
Court held that the Copyright and Trademm'k Clause is
both a grant of power and a limitation. . .. [Congress may
not] enlarge the patent monopoly 'without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby.
Moreover, Congress may not authodze the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from
the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available. 241
Most recently, in FeistPublicatiolls, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the
Court held that tlle constitutional scope of copyright cont.-uned a requirement of odginality; Congress was not free to allow copyright in
facts or in non-odginal works. 242 It is difficult to imagine that a copydght of infinite term would be constitutional, mld Congress could
probably not enact a copydght law in tlle old English censorial form,
giving exclusive dghts (and ensuring profitable production) only to

238 In TtIT1lCl" 1, Justice Kennedy found that congressional judgmcnts nrc cntitlcd to
substantial deference, but tIlat courts must still e.xercise independcnt judgmcnt when First
Amendment rights are at issue. He defined tIle judicial obligation as assuring that "Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based 011 substantial C\idcnce." 512 U.s. 622. GOO
(1994); see also Perlman & Rhinelander, sllpra note 1, at 405 (arguing that courts should
not disrupt congressional judgment about tIle particular balance in coppight cases).
239 See DeepsoutIl Packing Co. y. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (19i2).
240 !d. at 530.
241 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
242 See499 U.S. 340 (1991).Jane Ginsburg has argued that Congress can do under the
Commerce Clause what it may not do under the Coppight Clause, at least for r.,clltal
compilations SUdl as yellow pages. SceJalle C. Ginsburg, No "Sll'ml-r Copyright 01/(1 01""
Protection ojW0I7CS ojlIz/OnTlotion After Feist Y. Rural Telephone, 92 CoLUM. L R£\'. 338. 36784 (1992). I assume for my purposes that if tIle First Alllcndmcnt inmlidates a particular
vision of copyright, a similar law passed under tIle Commerce Clause would also fhil. Gh"C1l
tIle speech-promoting functions of cop}ught, we should be suspiciolls of attcmpts to make
information policy tItrough tIle Commerce Clause whell tIle cop}ught power appears inadequate.
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state-approved works. 243 If a court were to determine that Congress
had failed to identify a speech-based justification for some aspect of
copyright and the law suppressed more speech-maybe a lot morcthan it promoted, it would be obligated to tell Congress to try again.
With limited empirical evidence at hand, Congress would need at
least a persuasive economic theory to explain why its preferred copyright regime did not limit substantially more speech than necessary.2-H
The justification would not, however, require that each work protected increased the incentive to speak, since the marginal contribution of anyone work is minimal. Instead, the effect of a decision to
grant rights in the copyright owner or in the user should be generalized, to see what the effects on speech would be if a right or a use became widespread. 245 As Justice Souter recently suggested in the campaign finance context, "the quantum of empirical evidence needed to
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary
up or down Witll the novelty and plausibility of the justification
raised. "246
Jessica Litman has examined the legislative history of the 1976
Copyright Act, and concludes that Congress adopted compromises
between industry groups. Producers and large consumers of information such as libraries were represented, and ordinary viewers and
readers were not. The result was expansive definitions of copyright
holders' rights coupled with narrow exceptions to protect the few in243 See United Christian Scientists v. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs., 829 F.2d 1152 (D.C. Ch~
1987) (rejecting a congressional attempt to extend the copyright in Mary Baker Eddy's
works for an extra period as unconstitutional favoritism toward religion). Bul st'e San Fmncisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (discussing various super-intellectual property rights that have been granted to favored org.llIlzations such as the U.S. Olympic Committee).
244 In Jane Ginsburg's opinion, for example, Congress can supply content to the Copy·
right Clause by defining the limits of copyright. See Ginsburg, supra note 2,J2, at 375-82.
Yet note how uncertainty worked for the Religious Freedom Restomtioll Act. Without (:vl·
dence of widespread suppression of religious practices, Congress was not allowed to ex·
pand protection for religion beyond that which courts were prepared to give. St't! City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In the case of copyright, a claim that allthors wlll
have to stop writing if they cannot get more years of exclusive rights, strengthened pel"
formance rights or the like cannot really suffice to justifY expanded protection. Instead,
courts should demand rigorous findings from Congress that adequately set forth the teasons for altering the balance. Cf. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Poslsccondm'y Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (finding evidence of trademark illfringelllcnt by states
insufficient to justifY abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
245 See Mitchell Bros. Film Corp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852. 860 (5th Ch~
1979) (holding that Congress can find that a class of works promotes the useful ,lI'ts with·
out requiring proof that each work in the class does so).
246 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 120 S. Ct. 897, 900 (2000).
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formation users at the bargaining table. 247 Congress, and individual
members, did not understand or even agree with the particulars of
the law adopted. Rather, the legislature brokered a series of deals between industries and then wrote them into law.248 This is not our ideal
of policymaking, and it does not fit the Tumer vision of serious congressional consideration of the values at stake. The process was
probably a good way of allocating copyright ownership as between the
various contenders (authors, publishers, etc.) who were all represented, but it was a bad way of defining the scope of copyright against
other parties.249 This history, and the similar genesis of industrysponsored legislation to increase lights in information in years since,
provides another reason for courts to scrutinize specific assertions of
rights against information-users with greater care.so
The Tumer cases suggest that Congress needs credible evidence
that its copyright law enhances speech. A speech-sensitive analysis
would make expansions of copyright owners' rights such as the addition of moral rights to copyright, protection for derivative works, and
the recent retroactive extension of the copyright term2.51 look highly
suspect.
24i See Jessica D. Liunan, Copyrigllt, Compromise. alld Ugislalitl{' Hislory. 72 CoRNELL
L REv. 857 (1987) [hereinafter Liunan, Compromisr]; sre also Jessica Litman, &,isillg Copyright Lmv for the bifonnationAge, 75 OR. L RE\'. 19,22-23 (1996) [hereinafter Litman, &';sing].
2~ Sometimes e\'en the industry members who agreed on compromise positions did
not agree on what those provisions meant. See Liunan, CompromiSl', slIpra note 2·17, at 877,
887-88.
249 See ld. at 894-95.
250 See Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Cojl)~ 108 YALE LJ. 1661, 1685-86 (1999). History
should make \IS particularly leery when a Congress pressured by established media industries tries to protect them from new media, which have in thc past thrh"ed in the absence
of specific regulation. See Liunan, Rel.lisillg, slIpra notc 247, at 27-29; sre also [Jollie R«ort/illg
of Cojl)"igilled Works: Hearillgs before Ihe SlIbC(}IIImittre OIL Collrls, Cit,i/ llbrrlirs, alld IIII' ~\dmilli
stratioll ofJustice of the House Judiciar), Committee. 97th Congo (1982) (testimony of Howard
'Wayne Olh"er, AFrRA) (testiljing that audio and \ideo tape recording had to be curlailt"tl
to save mO\ies and TV). New media usually mean new market participants, new voices ami
new listeners, see Liunan, Rroisi71g. supra note 247, at 29; this connection to the First
Amendment's diversity-promotion goal should not bc ignored becausc of fears that established firms "ill not be able to compete.
251 Pub. L No. 105-298, 112 St.'lt. 287 (1998) (codificd at scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.). See Netanel, supra note 63, at 369; Nimmer, Cojl)'riglll, supra note 16. at 1193
("[\\'Jhen we consider cop}Tight protection beyond thc lifc e.... pcctancy of the author's
children and grandchildren thc balancc between speech and cop}Tight must shift. 111e
real, if relatively slight, speech interest in e.... pression remains constant, while the COP}Tighl
interest in encouraging creathity largely vanishes."). Nimmer's assessment of the balance
ofincenth"es is probably biased in fiwor of cop}Tight; givcn the prcscnt discounted value of
the re\'enues that "ill accrue to an author's grandchildren, C\"cn if the coppighl remains
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CONCLUSION

Copyright poses a serious First Amendment problem. It restl'icts
speech pervasively and powerfully, and its contours are ill-defined. Its
saving grace is that it is better for free speech than its absence woulcl
be. This article made the First Amendment case against and for copy~
right, concluding that copyright is justified as a way for govel'11ment to
promote a wide range of speech. Nevertheless, copyright's wide~
ranging effects on speech require careful balancing so that the needs
of future creators are not lost in the name of protecting the property
rights of those who have already spoken.
The implications of taking market-based and incentive theories
seriously can justify the Supreme Court's new approach to evaluating
speech-generating regulations in the Turner cases. Although the Court
treated must-carry as a free speech issue, not a property ownership
issue, the Court clearly saw a market opposed to a government regulator rather than a soapbox-pounding speaker fighting Big Brothel~ Cable operators are not very much like orators or authors in the Romantic sense. They are shopkeepers who price and deliver a product. As
such, treating must-carry as a problem of potential market failure and
monopoly made sense. But, because the problem was also a First
Amendment problem-having appeared after the First Amendment
became a significant constraint on government action rather than before, like copyright-the Court applied a higher standard to this market regulation than it does when non-speech markets are at issue.
Like must-carry, copyright is about economics and speech. The
challenge of reconciling modern constitutional docU"ine on economic
and social regulation with modern free speech doctrine may be the
most serious constitutional difficulty of our time. Copyright forces us
to recognize that government has an essential role to play ill creating
the conditions for speech. Furthermore, that government role is
predicated on specific judgments about the value of broad classes of
speech, and has systematic effects on content and expression. If government intervention and value judgments are inevitable, free speech
inquiry should not focus on the necessity of government intervention,
a useless debate, but rather on the kinds of value judgments that are
acceptable in distinguishing speech that may be prohibited-in copyright, infringing speech-from speech that will be protected against
and by government intervention.
quite valuable throughout a lengthened term, the incremental inccnth'c to Cl'clItivity of a
copyright that extends much after an author's death is vanishingly small.
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The conceptual separation between copyright and free speech
doctrine stems from a general assumption that speech as free speech
is not about profit but about politics or self-expression, while people
using speech as a profitable commodity have no real invesuuent in its
actual content. Although the reality is that the same words often play
both roles, a speech claim is created by characterizing words as matters of private choice, while a copyright claim is created by characterizing them as salable property. The challenge of modern copyright
law is to explain how words can be both meaningf"lll and profitable,
protected speech and protected property.
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